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PANEL VI
MANDATORY PRO BONO: COLLECTIVE
DISCHARGE OF DUTY OR COMPELLED
FREE SERVICE?
MANDATORY PRO BONO: COMFORT FOR THE
POOR OR WELFARE FOR THE RICH?
Jonathan R. Maceyt
INTRODUCTION

Lawyers have served indigent clients and worthwhile but impecunious causes without pay for centuries.' Unfortunately, this laudable tradition of public service has not done much for the legal
profession's overall reputation, which continues to languish. The
age-old debate about whether lawyers should be compelled to provide
services to nonpaying clients as a condition for retaining their
licenses to practice law resurfaced recently when a committee appointed by the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals to
study the legal needs of the poor concluded that lawyers should be
compelled to donate 20 hours every year to serving the poor.2
Proposals to compel lawyers to provide free legal services to the
indigent have been around for about as long as the world has been
inhabited by lawyers and poor people. No less a philosophical luminary than St. Thomas Aquinas addressed the issue in Question 71 of
the Summa Theologica, asking the question, "Whether an advocate is
bound to defend the suits of the poor?" His answer, like mine, was
4
a resounding no.

t J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. While I am indebted for
helpful conversations on the topic of mandatory pro bono with my colleagues Roger
Cramton and Chuck Wolfram, the views expressed in this essay are mine alone. This
Article was prepared separately for publication but draws upon the ideas the author
presented at the Convention.
1 David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735,
735 (1980).
2 COMMITTEE TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES, FINAL REPORT TO
THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1990).
3 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AqUINAs, LXXI Part II, Question, at
273 (Fathers of the English Domincian Province trans., R&T Washbourne, Ltd., 1918).
4 Essentially Aquinas takes the position that providing legal services for the poor is
a corporal work of mercy that is very personal. The obligation to provide legal services
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The reason lawyers ought not to be obliged to help the poorindeed the reason forcing lawyers to serve the poor is odious and
unethical-is that we can make both lawyers and the poor better off
by abandoning mandatory pro bono and providing the poor with
lump sum transfers of cash. In other words, if the rationale for
mandatory pro bono is to help the poor, then it is a peculiarly bad
way to provide assistance. Alternatively, mandatory pro bono may
really be designed to serve some other purpose besides helping the
poor. In fact, I will argue that the real effect of a mandatory pro
bono system will be to transfer wealth from solo practitioners and
lawyers in small- and medium-sized firms to lawyers in large firms.
I
MANDATORY

PRO BONO

AND THE POOR

Contrary to popular belief, mandatory pro bono will not help
the poor. To understand why this is so, one must first understand
that the real reason why the poor do not presently consume more
legal services is because they are rational. Given their limited
wealth, the poor simply would rather spend their money on other
things. In other words, legal services are very, very low on a poor
person's shopping list. Food is higher. Shelter is higher. Clothing
is higher. And even after all of those expenses are covered, lawyers
should not be surprised to learn that a poor person might choose to
allocate his resources in ways other than hiring a lawyer-like buying a car or obtaining an education.
The low demand for lawyers' services by the poor and the middle class provides strong evidence that most people regard legal
services as an expendable luxury rather than as a necessity:
Except for a narrow range of property-related matters-conveyances, wills, and marital separations-the middle class makes just
about as little use of legal services as those who literally cannot
afford them. Even prepaid legal insurance plans have proved surprisingly unpopular. Why? Because people do not want to give
for the poor depends on the individual circumstances of each particular case. Because
no man has the resources or the capacity to provide help to all who need it, the obligation arises from the existence of a relationship between the person in need and the
provider:
He that lacks food is no less in need than he that lacks an advocate. Yet
he that is able to give food is not always bound to feed the needy. Therefore neither is an advocate always bound to defend the suits of the

poor ....
...

Now no man is sufficient to bestow a work of mercy on all those

who need it. Wherefore, as Augustine says... I since one cannot do good to
all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time, or any other

circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely united to us.
Id. at 274 (citation omitted).
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up what they would have to in order to buy a little more of our
lawyer justice, except when the expected benefit is worth the cost.
People's priorities are different. 5
In other words, poor people do not hire lawyers because they use
their limited resources to buy things that they value more than legal
services.
Given a choice between $2500 in cash and twenty billable hours
of legal services provided by a partner at a Wall Street law firm (valued at around $10,000), most people-middle class or poor-would
take the $2500 in cash.
In other words, if the lawyers compelled to provide pro bono
legal services to poor clients were permitted to negotiate with their
indigent clients, both the lawyers and the clients quickly would
agree that the clients should accept cash in lieu of legal services.
The lawyers could put the time they saved to more productive uses,
and the clients could buy some of the virtually infinite array of
goods and services they actually need. Everybody would be better
off.
Thus, requiring lawyers to provide legal services to the poor is
wasteful and inefficient. Both lawyers and their clients could improve their circumstances if lawyers could donate money directly to
the poor. The poor could then decide for themselves how best to
spend this largesse.
Ironically, the increased consumption of legal services by the
poor may actually harm the indigent rather than help them. For example, among the primary justifications for a regime of mandatory
pro bono is that poor people need representation in landlord-tenant
and matrimonial disputes.
Lawyers forced to do pro bono work will spend much of their
time representing people involved in matrimonial disputes who are
unable or unwilling to pay for legal representation. People getting
divorced may decline to hire lawyers to represent them for a variety
of reasons. The most plausible explanation for the failure of indigent people to hire lawyers in matrimonial disputes is that there are
not enough assets in the matrimonial estate to justify the expense.
A recent, study by Marsha Garrison shows that 31 percent of divorcing couples in New York State had a net worth of less than $5000
and 18 percent of divorcing couples had a negative net worth.6 In
light of these statistics, it is not hard to see why many couples ra5

John A. Humbach, Serving the Public Interest: An Overstated Objective, 65 A.B.A.

J.

564, 564-65 (1979).
6 Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes 34, tbl. 8 (1992) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).

1118

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1115

tionally decide that hiring a lawyer would not make sense. When
there is simply no material estate to fight over, it does not make
sense to hire lawyers a. combatants. What is difficult to understand
is why the supporters of mandatory pro bono think that anybody
benefits by providing impecunious couples with free legal representation. With the possible exception of matrimonial work, lawsuits
against landlords are expected to occupy the lion's share of the time
that lawyers compelled to provide legal services for the poor would
spend on mandatory pro bono. If more marginal lawsuits are
brought against landlords because lawyers need something to do to
fulfill their mandatory pro bono obligations, the landlords' costs of
providing housing to the indigent inevitably will go up. As the cost
of providing housing goes up, rents will increase, and the supply of
housing for the poor will go down. The benefit that some poor people derive from having representation in landlord-tenant disputes
must be weighed against the increased costs to tenants that will result from a regime of mandatory pro bono in which lawsuits are
brought against landlords regardless of whether the expected bene7
fits to the tenants outweigh the costs of the suit.
Litigation often produces benefits for plaintiffs and for society
as a whole because individuals who expect to pay damages for the
harm they cause have an incentive to reduce their harmful activities.
But pro bono litigation is different. When clients must incur costs
to hire a lawyer, they will only bring lawsuits when the expected
benefits from litigation outweigh the costs of bringing suit, including the costs of hiring a lawyer. In the case of pro bono lawyering,
however, the cost of mounting litigation is reduced to zero, and clients will pursue litigation that produces little or no benefits.
Mandatory pro bono significantly exacerbates this problem because lawyers are forced to find client matters to fulfill their pro
bono obligations:
[S]uppose that lawyers, looking for ways to fill their quota [of required pro bono legal work], start impeding debt collection or
complicating evictions of nonrent-paying tenants. The immediate
result is to increase the fees to the lawyers of landlords and
merchants, thus increasing the costs of those suppliers [of goods
and services to the poor]. The longer-run effect is likely worse: to
increase the price or decrease the supply of housing and credit to
the poor.8

7

Humbach, supra note 5, at 566.

8

Id.
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II
MANDATORY PRO BONO AND TRANSFERS OF WEALTH
WITHIN THE LEGAL PROFESSION

If mandatory pro bono does not help the poor, then one must
wonder why it receives such enthusiastic support from elite groups
within the legal community. The basic reason stems from a lingering misconception among American lawyers that prosperity, virtue,
and inequality simply can be legislated away. As a distinguished European journal of public affairs recently observed, "[t]o a lot of
Americans, it now seems that prosperity can be bought like insurance." 9 Thejournal went on to point out that while social engineering has become unpopular in Eastern Europe, it seems to be
flourishing in the United States. 10
A second reason for the support given to mandatory pro bono
programs is probably more psychological than philosophical. People generally, including lawyers, believe (or cause themselves to believe) that the work they do contributes to the good of mankind.
Therefore, lawyers, like other people, desperately want to believe
that society would benefit from maximizing, rather than merely optimizing, the total level of legal services provided.
Putting self-deception aside, the ineluctable reality is that nobody really believes that mandatory pro bono programs will help
the poor. Nonetheless, mandatory pro bono regimes find strong
support in the upper strata of the legal profession. This is not surprising because these upper strata will be the real beneficiaries of
mandatory pro bono programs.
It is no coincidence that the big push for mandatory pro bono is
coming from big firm lawyers at a time when demand for the services of those firms is lagging appreciably behind the available supply." This temporary disequilibrium is evidenced by layoffs of
partners and associates at large law firms.
Mandatory pro bono programs will help large law firms by increasing the demand for lawyers to defend suits brought under such
programs. Lawyers forced to bring cases on behalf of poor people
will usually be bringing them against defendants who must pay to
hire lawyers to defend those suits. In other words, mandatory pro
bono programs artificially expand society's demand for paid legal
services. In particular, the demand for the services of lawyers at
large firms who specialize in representing defendants will increase.
As one commentator presciently has observed, "[W]henever clients
9
10

I

From There to Intolerance, THE

ECONOMIST,

July 20, 1991, at 15.

Id.
Saundra Torry, Skadden's Layoffs Signal an Uneasy New Erafor Lawyers, WASH. POST,

Oct. 7, 1991, at F5.
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who cannot pay get more legal services, clients who can pay need
more legal services. This results in new business for the bar."' 12
A mandatory pro bono requirement will increase the demand
for lawyers in large law firms in other, subtler ways. First, under the
New York plan, lawyers at large law firms could credit the excess pro
bono hours of some lawyers in the firm to meet the obligation of
other lawyers in the firm. 13 This flexibility will benefit large firms
far more than small firms, because large firms can more easily afford
to hire lawyers to specialize in pro bono work. In large firms the pro
bono activities of these lawyers can be amortized over a large
number of lawyers. In addition, at any given time, large firms predictably will have excess capacity in certain practice areas and no
room for additional work in others. These large firms can ameliorate this problem by shifting the burden of pro bono work onto the
shoulders of the lawyers with extra time in their schedules. This is a
luxury that smaller, more specialized firms lack because all of the
lawyers in such firms are likely to have slack times and busy times
simultaneously.
Even if lawyers in large law firms were prohibited from assigning the burden of their pro bono obligations to other, more junior lawyers in the firm, satisfying the burdens of a mandatory pro
bono obligation would still be easier for a large firm. Suppose, for
example, that a solo practitioner is scheduled to make a court appearance on a particular day for a pro bono client. During that day
the solo practitioner will be unable to represent any of his paying
clients. By contrast, a large law firm simply can reassign personnel
(many of whom will have expertise in the relevant area of law) to
handle the work of the absent lawyer.
In addition to the disproportionately heavy burden of reallocating caseloads on lawyers in smaller firms, solo practitioners and lawyers in small firms are less able to amortize the fixed costs of a
mandatory pro bono program across the firm as a whole. Moreover,
most pro bono plans, including the one being discussed in New
York, allow lawyers in small firms (10 or fewer) and solo practitioners to buy their way out of their obligations for a flat fee.14 Thus the
lawyer in the solo or small practice must pay retail to satisfy the pro
bono requirement, while the lawyer in the large firm can satisfy the
requirement by purchasing legal services wholesale by utilizing
intra-firm talent. Despite the fact that lawyers in large firms cannot
buy their way out of the proposed pro bono legal obligations, the
12

Humbach, supra note 5, at 566.

Roger C. Cramton, Mandatory Pro Bono, Address Before the Tompkins County
Bar Association (Nov. 16, 1989).
14
Excerptsfrom the Recommendations, N.Y.L. J., Dec. 8, 1989, at 1.
13
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plan is still highly regressive. As a result, the plan is unpopular with
the relatively impecunious lawyers who practice at small firms.
Mandatory pro bono programs also benefit large firms at the
expense of smaller firms because under some pro bono plans, large
firms can fulfill their obligations by doing work for foundations and
other low-pay/high-prestige clients that such firms normally represent. Similarly, unlike small firms and solo practitioners, large firms
can use mandatory pro bono programs as vehicles for training associates because younger lawyers working for large firms that deal almost exclusively with very high stakes legal issues understandably
do not get as much courtroom experience or contact with paying
clients as lawyers at smaller firms that litigate smaller stakes issues.
III
THE GOOD OLD DAYS: THE LEGAL PROFESSION AS
SOMETIME MONOPOLY

A final argument in favor of mandatory pro bono is that lawyers
are professionals, and as such, their license to practice law comes
with certain societal obligations. In less prosaic terms, the licensing
requirements of the bar have created barriers to entry that permit
lawyers to earn super-competitive profits. According to this argument, lawyers are under an obligation to perform legal services for
the poor in order to compensate society for the social losses associated with their monopoly position. Since the legal profession's monopoly allows it to charge above-market prices, this monopoly status
permits lawyers to transfer wealth from the rest of society to themselves. Mandatory pro bono requirements merely effectuate a retransfer back to society of this initial wealth transfer. But this
argument is completely flawed.
If at any time in history the legal profession was a monopoly, it
is not any longer. If one hundred years ago lawyers erected barriers
to entry that enabled them to obtain monopoly profits, those were
short-term gains that are not presently being enjoyed by members
of the profession. This is because nonlawyers, observing the economic rents earned by a cartelized legal profession, would begin expending the resources and developing the human capital necessary
to enter the profession and obtain these rents. Thus any gains from
cartelizing the legal profession were lost long ago by competition
from new entrants.
Unfortunately, the disappearance of abnormal returns brought
about by the increased competition for entry into a cartelized legal
profession does not eliminate the lawyer's incentive to maintain the
restrictions that led to the cartelization. Lifting entry restrictions on
lawyers would increase the short-run supply of lawyers and deprive
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those lawyers who were practicing before the restrictions were lifted
of a normal return on the human capital investments they made in
order to become lawyers.
Thus, as with most regulations, lawyer licensing requirements,
once in place, create an incentive for the people subject to those
requirements to lobby for keeping them in place even after the abnormal returns from the entry restrictions have disappeared. The
point is not that licensing requirements for lawyers should be maintained, but rather that lawyers currently in practice are earning only
normal-not super-competitive-returns on their investments in
human capital. Consequently, the presence of entry restrictions in
the form of state bar licensing rules does not justify imposing a
mandatory pro bono requirement on lawyers currently in practice.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most disturbing aspects of the mandatory pro bono
debate relate to what it implies about the legal profession's view of
itself. Those who favor imposing a mandatory pro bono obligation
on lawyers make two implicit assumptions that I wish both to expose
and to dispute. First, the idea of a mandatory pro bono obligation
implies that some work done by lawyers (like representing the indigent) furthers society's interests, while the rest (like representing
corporations) hurts society. But corporate lawyers who represent
corporations that are attempting to obtain capital for expansion also
provide benefits for society. Lawyers who represent clients before
regulatory agencies benefit society at least as much as lawyers who
represent indigent clients in divorce actions or landlord-tenant disputes. In other words, imposing a mandatory pro bono regime perpetuates the public perception that lawyers are a net drag on the
economy. The idea of mandatory pro bono also fuels the public's
perception that legal services provided free to poor people further
the public interest, while the provision of legal services to paying
clients serves no purpose other than to transfer wealth from society
as a whole to a few undeserving lawyers.
Similarly, a second unavoidable attribute of mandatory pro
bono programs is that they inevitably will require some bureaucratic
determination of what constitutes pro bono legal services. Making
this determination will require either a substantial bureaucracy or
some highly arbitrary determination that any lawsuit on behalf of an
indigent person or other favored group is pro bono. Neither of
these alternatives is particularly attractive.
Finally, the passionate embrace of mandatory pro bono
schemes by certain elites within the legal profession reflects a misplaced and somewhat disturbing vision of the role of lawyers in soci-
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ety. On the one hand, it seems uncontrovertible that, despite their
unpopularity, lawyers accomplish a great deal of good in society in a
wide variety of ways. But this does not mean that increasing the
general level of legal services in society by requiring lawyers to perform services they would not otherwise perform will benefit society.
By requiring lawyers to subsidize litigation that society would not
otherwise support, the legal profession will confirm suspicions that
our society is too litigious and that lawyers take themselves way, way
too seriously.
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INTRODUCTION

Pity the civil jury, seen by some as the sickest organ of a sick
system. Yet the jury has always been controversial.1 In America
even before 1800, New York canal builders, perceiving excessive
jury awards, sought and secured legislation to avoid jury determination of land values. 2 In the nineteenth century, several states, con3
sciously promoting railroad growth, restricted the jury right.
Today, jury trials are the hot focus of much law reform debate, as
reformers suspicious ofjuries repeatedly urge policymakers to modify the right to jury trial. Tort critics catalogue problems with juries. 4 Businesses resist antidiscrimination legislation that would
grant jury trials, claiming it would subject more businesses to the
lawsuit "lottery." 5
One might suppose that, with so much at stake for so long, we
would all know a lot about the ways juries differ from judges in their
behavior. In fact, we know remarkably little.6 This Article provides
the first large-scale comparison of plaintiff win rates and recoveries
in civil cases tried before juries and judges. In two of the most con1 See Hans Zeisel, The Debate over the CivilJury in HistoricalPerspective, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 25. Compare Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 87, 103-17 (continuity of controversy's themes) with Delavan J. Dickson, Autonomy, Discretionand Representation:A Comparative Study ofJuiy Development in Athens,
England, and the United States of America, 49/09-A DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT'L 2794
(1988) (unpublished dissertation on file with the Cornell Law Review) (more evolutionary
view, seeing shift at late stage to irrationality and inefficiency arguments that mask political aims).
2 MORTONJ. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,1780-1860, at 67
(1977).
3 Id. at 84.
4 E.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); Dan Drazan, The Casefor SpecialJuries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 72 JUDIcATURE 292 (1989); see also Stephen Daniels, The Question ofJury Competence and the Politicsof
Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 269, 270 (critics see civil jury as "causal link" in current crisis); Stephen
Daniels &Joanne Martin,Jury Verdicts and the "Crisis"inCivil Justice, 11 JusT. Sys.J. 321
(1986) (refuting those who blame jury system for civil liability crisis).
5 Civil Rights Act of 1990:JointHearingson H.R. 4000 Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. vol. 2, at 96 (1990) (statement of Mr. Victor Schachter).
6 See ROBERT J. MACCOUN, GETTING INSIDE THE BLACK Box: TOWARD A BETTER
UNDERSTANDING OF CIVILJURy BEHAVIOR 41-42 (1987). On the state of empirical research in civil procedure, see generally Symposium, Empirical Studies of Civil Procedure (pt.
1), LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 1.
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troversial areas of modem tort law-product liability and medical
malpractice-the win rates substantially differ from other cases' win
rates and in a surprising way. Plaintiffs in these two areas prevail at
trial at a much higher rate before judges than they do before juries.
Furthermore, in several categories of personal-injury liability, the
mean recovery in judge trials is higher than the mean recovery in
jury trials. This Article's goal is to explore how and why these win
rates and recoveries differ.
The empirical results prove resistant to simple explanations.
Differences in the size of award, for instance, do not fully explain
differences in win rates. This Article considers the results in light of
the parties' ability to choose between ajudge trial and ajury trial. It
concludes that (1) the most plausible explanation of the data lies in
small differences between judges' and juries' treatment of cases and,
more importantly, in the parties' varying the selection of cases that
reach judge and jury; (2) litigants' stereotypical views about juries
may lead them to act unwisely in choosing between judge trials and
jury trials; and (3) the surprising win rates in product liability and
medical malpractice cases may stem from the especially strong misperceptions litigants hold about judge and jury behavior in these
cases. More simply put, certain groups of plaintiffs do far better
before judges, but the reason likely lies in prevailing misperceptions
about juries.
Part I sketches stereotypical and scholarly impressions ofjudge
and jury trial outcomes. Part II tests these impressions by using
data on trial outcomes in judge and jury trials for major areas of tort
and contract law. Part III seeks to explain the unpredicted patterns
of the data by taking into account the size of awards and local factors. This unsuccessful effort leads us to consider the role of misperception and the settlement process as sources of the observed
results. Part IV contrasts perceptions of judge/jury behavior with
the limited empirical evidence available, finding little support for
the widespread perception that juries are biased or incompetent.
Part V combines the realities of judge/jury behavior with the litigants' settlement behavior to formulate our explanation of the data.
I
IMPRESSIONS OF OUTCOMES IN JUDGE AND JURY TRIALS

It is helpful to separate two sources of opinions about differences between judge and jury trials. Lay and professional perceptions about jury behavior are one source. Recent insights of
scholars supply the other.

1992]
A.

TRIAL BYJURY OR JUDGE

1127

The Popular View

The first source, which we shall call the "popular" view, is the
mass of stereotypical views about juries held by the public, including
the legal profession. 7 Tort reformers and others portray juries as
having a pro-plaintiff bias." Juries are believed to find liability when
judges would not, to grant higher awards than judges, and to grant
inappropriate punitive damages awards. 9 For example, if asked
whether product liability plaintiffs prevail at a greater rate before
judges or juries, most people would answer "juries." 10 Informal
surveys of professors and students strongly confirm this for both
7

See Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessonsfrom CivilJuty

Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 742-44 (1991); cf. Daniels, supra note 4, at 305-08 (public

opinion polls); Edith Greene et al., Jurors' Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size of
Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 811-18 (1991) (questionnaires to jurors). By
labeling this source the popular view we do not mean to attribute it only to the uninformed laity. As this view is developed below, it is perhaps more strongly the popular
view within the legal profession and among policymakers. See infra text accompanying
notes 61-65.
One popular misconception probably limited to the laity is that all trials are jury
trials. In fact, our database for 1979 to 1989 shows that 55.5% of the 130,686 federal
civil trials are judge trials. See also CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS

644 (4th ed. 1983) (majority are judge trials). For state courts of general jurisdiction,
because of their heavy domestic relations and estate dockets, about 96% of the vastly
more numerous state civil trials are judge trials (98% in state courts of limited jurisdiction). VICTOR E. FLANGO ET AL., THE BUSINESS OF STATE TRIAL COURTS 51-53, 130-39

(1983). Incidentally, some 987 of the world's civil jury trials take place in the United
States. Hans Zeisel, The American Juy, inTHE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM: FINAL REPORT OF
THE 1977 CHIEFJUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES
65, 65 (1977). But cf Basil S. Markesinis, Litigation-ManiainEngland, Germany and the
USA: Are We So Very Different?, 49 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 233, 246-47 (1990) (recognizing in
comparative study that continental judges might behave like American juries).
The number of federal civil jury trials, as well as the fact that a fair proportion occur
in nontort cases, makes the federal courts an appropriate locus for study, despite their
relatively small docket. See Marc Galanter,Juty Shadows: Reflections on the CivilJury and the
"Litigation Explosion," in THE AMERICAN CIVIL JURY: FINAL REPORT OF THE 1986 CHIEF
JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES

15, 18-19

(1987); see also infra note 46 (discussing data from state courts).
8 E.g., HUBER, supra note 4, at 119-20, 185-88; see Marc Galanter, The.CivilJuyy as
Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 201, 206-09.
9 E.g., HUBER, supra note 4, at 127-32; W. Kip VISCUsI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LrA-

BiLFrY 88 (1991); Pete V. Domenici & C. Everett Koop, Sue the Doctor? There's a Better Way,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1991, at A25 ("outrageously high jury awards").
10 In civil rights and other specialized areas, intuitions about juries may differ. For
example, juries may find those suing the government and its officers less appealing than
they find the defendants. Theodore Eisenberg, LitigationModels and Trial Outcomes in Civil

Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. LJ. 1567, 1594-95 (1989); Jon 0. Newman, Suing the
Lawbreakers: Proposalsto Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE LJ. 447, 454 (1978). Any pro-plaintiffjury bias may be outmatched by the
jury's possible prejudice against the likely black, Puerto Rican, poor, felon, or drug addict status of those victimized by government. Id. For purposes of this study, this countervailing factor is not relevant. Our data emphasize tort and contract cases against
nongovernmental defendants, where discrimination and other problems plaguing many
civil rights plaintiffs do not have a systematic effect.
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product liability and medical malpractice cases. In those cases, the
law professors, dispute resolution experts, and upperclass law students surveyed predicted significantly higher success rates in jury
trials than in judge trials."l
Outside the area of personal-injury tort litigation, perceptions
ofjury bias are less clear. In contract actions, for example, one lacks
an injured plaintiff seeking recovery from a larger, more powerful
defendant. Popular wisdom and informal surveys suggest that the
jury effect would be less drastic outside the area of personal-injury
2
tort litigation.1
B.

The Academic View

A growing body of literature on what has come to be called the
selection effect is the second source of forecasts about the relationship between judge and jury trials.' 3 We shall call this the "aca11 The following table shows the mean predicted plaintiff trial win rate (in percent)
as well as the significance level of the judge/jury difference within each group of respondents. The number of respondents is in parentheses.
TABLE 1

Product Liability
Medical Malpractice
Judge Jury p
Judge
Jury p
Law Professors (46)
43.6 62.9 .000
41.5
62.1 .000
Dispute Experts (10)
32.5 42.5 .012
28.5
37.5 .027
Law Students (14)
38.2 52.7 .002
38.9
53.8 .001
One can view the above table as exploring the hypothesis that each group predicts
the same mean trial win rates for judge and jury trials. By convention, the hypothesis
being tested usually is called the null hypothesis. GEORGE W. SNEDECOR & WIu.LA G.
COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS 64 (8th ed. 1989). The p values (also called significance levels) reported in the table are the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis
when it is true. The p values provide an inverse measure of the likelihood that the
difference in means show real differences in the predicted judge/jury trial win rates
rather than mere random variation. Id. Thus, for law professors there is less than 1
chance in 1000 of erroneously rejecting the hypothesis of equal predicted win rates for
judge and jury trials. Another way of describing rejection of the tested hypothesis is to
say that the difference in means is significant at the level indicated by the p values. The
law professor results thus are significant beyond the .001 level. Throughout this Article
we use the term "significant" in the formal statistical sense of significance level. The
smaller the p value or level of significance, the more surprised one would be to observe
the difference in means if the tested hypothesis (equality of means) were true. By arbitrary convention, results that are significant at or beyond the .05 level are often described simply as statistically significant. E.g., THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL
AssEssMENTs As EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 197 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989).
12
Compare the following table with Table 1, supra note 11.
TABLE 2
Contract
Judge Jury p
Law Professors (46)
50.0 48.8 .304
Dispute Experts (10)
44.0 41.5 .244
Law Students (14)
45.0 43.8 .476
13
LEGAL

E.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13J.
STUD. 1 (1984). Compare Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Casesfor Trial Biased?,
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demic" view. In general, "It]he selection effect refers to the
proposition that the selection of tried cases is not a random sample
of the mass of underlying cases."' 14 More specifically, theorists have
tried to describe the biased trial sample, most often proceeding as
follows. Cases only go to trial when the parties substantially disagree on the predicted outcome of trial. In other cases, both parties
can save the extra cost of trial by settling in light of their knowledge
of the applicable legal rules and all other aspects of the case. When
the legal rules clearly favor either the plaintiff or the defendant, the
case tends to settle readily. Difficult cases falling close to the applicable legal standard tend not to settle, because the parties are more
likely to disagree substantially in their predicted outcomes. These
unsettled close cases fall more or less equally on either side of the
legal standard, regardless of both that standard's position and the
underlying distribution of disputes. Thus, even if the legal standard
highly favors plaintiffs, one might not observe a plaintiff trial win
rate well above 50%. Instead, the selection effect will leave for trial
a residue of unsettled cases exhibiting some nonextreme equilibrium win rate.
This selection effect theory does not necessarily question the
popular perception of pro-plaintiffjury bias in personal-injury cases.
It does question whether the popular perception of juries, even if
true, translates into higher observable trial win rates before juries
than before judges. 15 Parties adjust their settlement behavior not
only in light of the applicable legal standard, but also in light of the
decisionmaker, including the mode of trial. Even ifjuries are more
favorable to plaintiffs than are judges, one might not observe this
through higher plaintiff win rates in jury trials. If both parties perceive that one party has a highly favorable adjudicator, the case is
unlikely to be tried. In cases that could be tried before juries, the
parties who know of the pro-plaintiff bias will adjust their settlement
behavior to account for the increased value of the plaintiff's claim.
If a judge is known to be pro-plaintiff, the defendant will demand a
jury trial or try to settle the case in a manner that reflects knowledge
of the judge's behavior. Those cases that survive the settlement
process and reach jury or judge trials should not be easy wins for
14J. LEGAL STUD. 185 (1985) (criticizing Priest and Klein's model) with George L. Priest,
Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learningfrom Wittman's Mistakes, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 215
(1985) (defending the model).
14 Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with
Empirical Tests, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 337 (1990).
15 Selection effect theory has not previously been extensively developed as a source
of theory about judge and jury trial differences. Some implications of selection effect
theory for this area, however, seem clear. See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1595-96; Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 337-38; Priest & Klein, supra note 13, at 5, 7, 35.
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plaintiffs or defendants. Just as legal standards favorable to plaintiffs (such as strict liability) need not and do not translate into high
trial win rates, 16 use of adjudicators who favor plaintiffs (such as,
perhaps, juries) need not lead to high trial win rates.
Thus, according to this selection effect theory, any judge/jury
distinction that the parties evaluate without systematic inaccuracy
should not lead to a difference in win rates before judges and juries.
Indeed, under simplifying assumptions, selection effect theory sug17
gests a trial win rate of 50% before both judges and juries.
Although comprehensive trial data do not support the 50% hypothesis,' 8 the underlying insight-that close cases tend to dominate the
limited universe of tried cases-is important in analyzing win rates
in judge and jury trials. We are concerned here not with any specific
win rate, such as 50%. The question is whether, even assuming a
pro-plaintiff jury bias and allowing for departures from 50% success, there is reason to believe that observed win rates before judges
and juries should differ substantially. Much of the thrust of selection effect theory suggests that trials before judges and juries ought
to result in similar win rates.19
Although basic selection effect theory developed to date would
not predict sharp judge/jury differences in win rates, it is worth
thinking through the circumstances under which a more fully developed theory would forecast observable judge/jury differences. Two
possible sources of differences are worth separating: (1) factors that
may be developed within the context of existing selection effect theory and (2) factors that reveal the incompleteness of existing selection effect theory for modeling the choice between judge and jury
trial.
First, within the context of existing selection effect theory, adjudicators highly favorable to one side, like favorable legal standards,
do not necessarily lead to different observed trial win rates, as already noted. What factors might lead to different rates?
16 For example, see the 42.8%o win rate in product liability cases reported in Priest
& Klein, supra note 13, at 37-43.
17 See Priest & Klein, supra note 13, at 17-20.
18 Eisenberg, supra note 14.
19 In our informal surveys covering product liability and medical malpractice cases,
dispute resolution experts forecast significantly (p 5 .05) lower differences in success
rates between judge trials and jury trials than did law professors. See supra note 11.

We are not prepared to argue that the academic view forecasts no differences between judge and jury trial win rates. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 13, at 228-29 (cases in
which main dispute concerns damages would increase win rate); J. Mark Ramseyer &
Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18J.
LEGAL STUD. 263, 284-85 (1989) (similar). It is sufficient for our purposes to suggest the
mechanism by which the win rates should tend toward equality.
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Different stakes to the parties is the most common explanation
of win rates that depart from selection effect theory's presumptions. 20 The doctor whose reputation may be harmed may have
more at stake than the money damages sought by the plaintiff. The
company defending a product liability action may have more at stake
than the money sought from it in the particular case. Such differential stakes may make defendants more willing to settle strong suits
and may lead to plaintiff win rates at trial lower than either 50% or
whatever other level one expects absent the differential stakes.
Greater stakes to plaintiffs may raise win rates. In studying differences between judge and jury trials, however, this differential stakes
explanation carries little weight. The doctor and the company may
have stakes different from the plaintiffs', but those stakes do not
vary with the mode of trial. The reputational harm to the doctor
and the potential flood of product liability cases against the company result whether these defendants lose in judge trials or jury

trials. 2

1

Instead, misperceptions about the adjudicator's standard of decision would provide a powerful explanation for different judge/jury
win rates. If the parties perceive the adjudicator to be favorable to
the plaintiff, but the adjudicator turns out not to be, then the apparently close cases would turn out to be losers and the win rate would
drop. Similarly, if the adjudicator appears to be neutral, but turns
out to be unfavorable to the plaintiff, then the win rate would drop.
Imagined biases or unperceived biases therefore affect win rate.
And if these misperceptions prevailed in different kinds or to differ20 See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1579, 1581-82; Priest & Klein, supra note 13, at 5,
24-29, 40; cf. Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining,and the Selection of Casesfor
Triak A Study of the Generation of Biased and UnbiasedData, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 341-45
(1988) (more complete modeling). See generally Kathleen Engelmann & Bradford Cornell, Measuring the Cost of Corporate Litigation: Five Case Studies, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 377
(1988) (studying asymmetrical stakes more generally); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D.
Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Casesfor Trial, 90
MICH. L. Rav. 319 (1991) (broadening consideration to include parties' strategic behavior). The differential stakes analysis can be applied to the litigants' different estimates of
the size of judgment and to different attitudes toward risk.
21
Analyis suggests various other possible pressures that would, at most, lead to
minor differences in judge/jury win rates. For example, differences in ability to assess
decisionmakers could lead to departures from 50% success. If defendants' attorneys are
systematically better at forecasting case outcomes than plaintiffs' attorneys, win rates at
trial should reflect this. See Wittman, supra note 20, at 325-27. But this difference, too,
should fade when the comparison is between win rates in the two different trial modes.
For this factor to translate into differences between judge trials and jury trials, the superior attorneys must enjoy their edge in a way that differs between the two kinds of trials.
For example, defendants' attorneys must enjoy a stronger edge in assessing judge trials
than they do in assessing jury trials. Yet one suspects that most factors that lead to
attorney superiority at assessment, such as experience, education, analytical ability, and
resources, apply to both modes of trial.
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ent degrees regarding judges and juries, then different judge/jury
win rates would result. 22
Another possible source of difference in judge/jury win rates
involves differential routing of strong or weak cases to the judge or
the jury. But this source is all too easy to exaggerate. After all,
routing is just the sort of effect that the selection effect should obliterate. Nevertheless, under certain conditions a skewed flow of cases
toward judge and jury could positively affect the win rates, although
under other conditions its effect could be negligible or even opposite. Under any plausible conditions, however, the effect of skewed
routing should be relatively minor. 23
Second, the central thrust of selection effect theory has been to
model which cases settle before trial and which cases go to trial, not
to model the choice between judge and jury trial. Perhaps a more
complete theory would forecast substantial differences in judge/jury
win rates.
Real dissimilarities exist between the settlement decision and
the choice of adjudicator. In deciding whether to settle or litigate,
both parties can benefit from a decision to settle by saving litigation
costs, and trial results only when the parties substantially disagree in
expectations. The choice of adjudicator differs. Either side can opt
for ajury trial and will do so when that choice increases its expected
return. One side would almost always seem to benefit from the
choice of jury trial. A judge trial would result only when its cost
savings overwhelmed any party's benefit from jury trial, the parties'
differing preferences or perceptions lead them both to see judge
trial as more favorable, or the interested party has inadvertently
waived jury trial.
Although the choice between judge and jury undoubtedly differs from the choice between settling and litigating, we doubt that it
does so in a way that undermines misperception as a powerfil
22
Cf id at 328 (proof of similar point). We later discuss a presumably lesser effect
of differing impediments to settlement. See infra text accompanying note 93.
23 See Priest & Klein, supra note 13, at 19-22. But cf Wittman, supra note 20, at 334
(critical nature of heteroscedastic error assumption). Similarly secondary and indeterminate, but offsetting, sources of difference in judge/jury win rates lie in such possible
jury characteristics as greater cost of trial, see infra note 59 and accompanying text, and
greater generosity in award, see infra note 70 and accompanying text. Compare also id. at
334-35 (unpredictability of award size tends to increase win rate) with id at 335-36 (large
awards imply lower win rate).
In subsequent analysis, we use the underlying insight of the widely accepted, strong
version of selection effect theory described in the text. If that theory is flawed, so that
judge and jury win rates do not tend toward equality in the absence of differential misperception, our explanation would still proceed along similar lines. The explanation
would be simpler to state, however, because we could rely more on the routing process
and less on the settlement process.
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source of difference. Given the process of choosing an adjudicator,
a consistently and pronouncedly differential routing of strong or
weak cases to the judge or jury does not suggest itself. Moreover,
once the cases are separated into judge and jury cases, if the parties
mutually and accurately perceive judge/jury differences, the settlement process, as in basic selection effect theory, should tend to reduce, though not necessarily eliminate, differences in win rates in
the residues of cases reaching trial. The data confirm this, for in the
vast majority of case categories there are relatively small differences
in judge/jury win rates. 2 4 But in some categories of jury cases,
where parties misperceive jury tendencies, the settlement process
that normally tends to produce a comparable win rate could be distorted in a way that produces a widely variant win rate. In judge
cases too, misperceptions could distort the settlement process, once
the parties have agreed on a judge trial for one reason or another.
II
DATA ON OUTCOMES IN JUDGE AND JURY TRILs

Differences in win rates between judge and jury trial thus might
be consistent with either the popular or the academic view. Each
view has a core prediction worth testing. The popular view forecasts greater personal-injury tort success before juries. The academic view expects to observe little difference in success between
the two trial modes. Does either view reflect reality?
Data gathered by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts enable us to compare the outcomes of judge trials and jury
trials for cases tried in federal court. When any civil case terminates
in federal district court, the court clerk files a form with the Administrative Office containing information about the case. 2 5 The form
includes data regarding the subject matter and jurisdictional basis of
the case, the amount demanded, the dates of filing and termination,
the procedural progress of the case at termination, including
whether it was tried before judge orjury, and, when ajudgment was
entered, who prevailed and any amount awarded in damages. The
Administrative Office form contains many subject matter categories,
including branches of tort, contract, civil rights, and other areas of
law. The data used here cover the fiscal years 1979 through 1989.26
24

See infra text accompanying note 39.

25

See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, XI GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLI-

CES AND PROCEDURES transmittal 64, at 11-19 to -28 (Mar. 1, 1985). For a complete
description of Administrative Office data, see INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR PoLIT-

1970-1987,
ICPSR 8429 (2d ed. Winter 1989) [hereinafter ICPSR].
26 The Administrative Office began recording who prevailed in 1979. ICPSR, supra
ICAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,

note 25, at 15 (civil codebook). Data after 1989 are not yet available to us.
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Strengths and weaknesses of the Administrative Office data are
27
noted elsewhere.
The Administrative Office data allow for several different approaches to determining whether there are differences between
judge and jury trials and to deciding what factors might explain
those differences. One can study different win rates before judges
and juries, different award patterns before judges and juries, and
differences in the rate at which the parties select judge and jury trials. Relationships among these factors also are of interest. With
several possible points of reference, there is no single obviously
"correct" comparison with which to begin the analysis. Ultimately,
we will explore all of these factors and others. We begin with plaintiff trial win rates for two reasons. First, it is a highly visible, comprehensible factor about which popular and academic views
generate predictions. Second, win rates so far have played the lead28
ing role in empirical studies of the selection effect.
Appendix A shows win rates at judge and jury trials, aggregated
for all ninety-four federal districts for eleven fiscal years in every
category of cases. 2 9 To be precise, the win rate is the fraction of
plaintiff wins among judgments for either plaintiff or defendant entered after full trial. Initial examination of the data shows that
neither popular nor academic predictions are uniformly true.
The notion that all plaintiffs need to do in any type of case is
"get to the jury" is thoroughly discredited, at least in its simplistic
sense. Plaintiffs lose a fair number of trials, including jury trials. In
fact, plaintiffs enjoy greater success before judges than before juries
in three major tort categories-product liability (personal injury),
medical malpractice, and motor vehicle. In only two large personalinjury categories-Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) and
marine-is there a significantly higher win rate before juries than
before judges. The most striking differences are in the product liability and medical malpractice categories.
27 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An EmpiricalStudy of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 518-22 (1990); Stewart
J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining ConstitutionalTort Litigation: The Influence of
the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNE.LL L. REV. 719, 723
(1988). One important limitation is the inability to distinguish among kinds of claims

within the Administrative Office categories. See, e.g., PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL

MALPRAC'ICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38-39 (1985) (type of injury in
medical malpractice cases relates to chance of winning).
28 E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 14; Priest & Klein, supra note 13.
29 The data we report here are limited to case categories that had at least one reported full trial during the period covered. Within the categories, data based on termination reports should reflect any adjustment of jury verdict by the trial judge, but not
any effect of appeal. On the generally small effect of appeal upon completed trials, see
Galanter, supra note 8, at 224-27.
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If the popular view founders on plaintiffs' frequently greater
success in judge trials, the academic view founders on the sharp differences in win rates within categories. The parties' settlement behavior does not lead to sending cases toward judges and juries in a
way that equalizes win rates. There are large differences between
win rates in many case categories, including highly visible areas such
as product liability and medical malpractice. One possible explanation for these results is that judges and juries receive different mixes
of cases because parties misperceive judge/jury differences. Before
examining possible explanations, however, it is necessary to screen
the case categories to identify classes of cases in which there truly is
a choice between judge trials and jury trials.
A.

Refining the Data

First, study should be limited to case categories with reasonable
numbers of cases tried before both judges and juries. Many case
categories have few judge trials or few jury trials3 ° Differences in
numerically small categories are too tenuous to warrant serious statistical inquiry.
Second, one must focus on case categories in which equitable
relief does not play a prominent role,3 ' because parties have no
right to jury trial in cases seeking solely equitable relief.3 2 Differences between judge and jury win rates are meaningful only when
the parties have a real choice between the two kinds of trial. To
illustrate, the case category called jobs in Appendix A shows an extremely low win rate in judge trials, 0.20, and a higher win rate in
jury trials, 0.39. The jobs category is dominated by cases brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which did not authorize jury trials. 33 The difference in judge/jury win rates may or
may not reveal that Title VII cases are more difficult to win than
other jobs cases. It does not, however, reveal differential treatment
of Title VII cases by judges and juries, because juries did not resolve
such cases. We therefore exclude case categories in which equitable
34
relief is prominent.
30 See infra Appendix A. In fact, none of the categories so eliminated had few judge
trials but a substantial number of jury trials.
31 See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1596-97.
32 KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 102 (2d ed. 1988).
33 THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 949 (3d ed. 1991).
34 For each category of cases, we examined the percentage of plaintiffs' judgments
after full judge trial that resulted in money awards (in contrast to equitable relief).
When more than about 90% of the awards were money awards, a level below which
there was a clear break in the data, we included the case category in the analysis. We
also eliminated the category of marine contract cases. The paucity of jury trials there
evidences the legal reality that judicial money awards result from the absence of a jury
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Third, other kinds of cases do not offer a true choice between
judge and jury trial. When the United States is a defendant, usually
no jury right exists. 3 5 For example, in a contract or tort action
brought under the Tucker Act or Federal Tort Claims Act, statute
dictates trial by judge.3 6 Medical malpractice cases against the Veterans' Administration, for a more specific example, do not present
the parties with a true choice between judge and jury trial. We thus
eliminate cases in which the United States is a defendant.
Eliminating numerically small categories, categories with a
prominent equitable component, and federal-government-as-defendant cases leaves the contract and tort categories and cases shown in
Table 3. Table 3 thus isolates the sizable case categories that most
7
clearly lead to a choice between judge and jury trial.3

trial right, unlike the situation in marine torts. See 9 CHARLrs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2315 (1971).

Within each of the retained categories, we compared the subset of cases in which
the plaintiff clearly requested monetary relief with the subset of cases for which the datum of amount demanded was missing. If the subset of cases with missing demands was
significantly associated with a higher percentage of judge trials, as in the category of
other fraud, we took the absence of an amount demanded to be a possible indicator of
equitable relief and so eliminated that subset in the particular category. Accordingly, we
retained the cases with missing demands in seven of the categories, which kept the
number of cases higher but perhaps included some cases in which the jury right derived
solely from a counterclaim. We analyzed the data for the effects of this retention decision. None of our major findings would be affected by excluding all cases with missing
demands.
35
Seeid § 2314.
36
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2402.
37 For greater expressiveness in Table 3, we change the category names of other
contract, other personal property damage, and other fraud to "general contract," "torts
to personal property," and "fraud."
For purposes of Table 3, and the analysis hereafter, we group the Administrative
Office's eight different product liability categories into a single category, "product liability." We do not wish to mask the substantial differences in win rates across product
liability categories, which are revealed by Appendix A. We are not confident, however,
that lawyers checking boxes on the civil cover sheet form, which is how cases are categorized in the Administrative Office's system, usefully distinguish among the different
product liability categories. An alternative approach would be to examine only the
"purest" product liability category, personal injury-product liability, which numerically
dominates all the other product categories combined. Limiting the analysis to this single product liability category would lead to no substantial difference in results.
It should also be noted that in 1985 in the Southern District of Ohio, defendants
won several hundred Bendectin cases in one joint jury trial. See Henderson & Eisenberg,
supra note 27, at 519 n.159. This giant trial depresses thejury win rate in product liability cases by several percent, an effect that is offset by the amalgamation of the nonpersonal-injury product liability cases with a higher jury win rate into our single artificial
product liability category. Thus, the results presented here are the consequence of
neither the new aggregate product category nor the unusual Bendectin litigation.
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TABLE

3

Outcomes In Sizable Categories Involving Clear Judge/Jury Choice
Judge Trial
N
Win
(completed) Rate
General
Airplane Personal Injury
Federal Employers' Liability
Assault, LiAbel, Slander
Marine Personal Injury
Other Personal Injury
General Contract
Torts to Personal Property
Torts to Land
Negotiable Instruments
Fraud
Motor Vehicle

Iury Trial
N
Win
(completed)
Rate

Win
Ratio.

75
94
86
889
516
3979
732
203
643
308
590

.53
.62
.43
.57
.51
.69
.63
.66
.81
.67
.69

324
1168
339
1455
2769
2458
458
149
173
265
3633

.62
.72
.49
.64
.49
.66
.59
.60
.73
.59
.60

0.85
0.86*
0.88
0.89***
1.04
1.05
1.07
1.10
1.110
1.14
1.15"**

456
64

.48
.50

3648
732

.28
.29

1.71"**
1.72"**

Prod-Med
Product Liability
Medical Malpractice
"Judge/jury win rates differ at .05 level;

B.

**

at .01 level;

at .001 level

Preliminary Observations

Table 3 introduces a single number, the "win ratio," to represent the relationship between judge trial win rate and jury trial win
rate. The win ratio is the judge trial win rate divided by the jury trial
win rate. The win ratio is greater than one when plaintiffs enjoy a
higher win rate before judges than before juries; the ratio equals
one when there is no difference between judge and jury win rates;
and it is less than one when plaintiffs enjoy a higher win rate before
juries than beforejudges. Using the win ratio to illuminate the success patterns in the surviving case categories reveals several notable
results.
First, six of the thirteen categories have win rates in judge and
jury trials that differ significantly at the .05 level.38 In two of the
categories, product liability and medical malpractice, the win rate
differences are both significant and large. These two distinctive categories, which we shall for brevity sometimes term "prod-med," obviously warrant special explanatory efforts.
Second, the differences in win rates do not follow a pattern predictable from either the popular or the academic view. If the popular view draws support from the greater plaintiff win rate in jury
trials for FELA and marine personal-injury cases, it must confront
the opposite relationship in motor vehicle, product liability, and
medical malpractice cases. The academic view suggests that win ra38

See supra note 11 (discussing statistical significance).
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tios should be near one, and so must confront ratios substantially
greater than one, as in the prod-med categories.
Third, there is a high positive correlation between rates of success in judge trials and rates of success injury trials. Plaintiffs tend
to do well before judges in the same case categories in which they
tend to do well before juries. 3 9
This brief examination detects differences in judge/jury win
rates worth trying to explain. The differences defy simple groupings, such as tort or contract. Yet the individual case categories
clearly do matter. For example, limiting consideration to categories
with significantly different win rates, the range of win ratios in tort
personal-injury cases spans from 0.86 for FELA cases to 1.72 for
medical malpractice cases. Plaintiffs thus range in winning from doing 14% worse before judges than before juries in FELA cases to
faring 72% better in medical malpractice cases. No explanation that
fails to account for individual case categories is likely to be
40
persuasive.
III
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS WITHIN THE OUTCOME DATA

Case categories are of central importance. Indeed, one might
conclude that they are all that matter. That is, win ratios may be a
function of the case category in a way such that little else, except the
unobserved innards of the case category, will help explain the different win ratios. Yet some possible explanations deserve exploration
before conceding that win ratios depend heavily on factors extrinsic
to the available data. This section investigates these explanations,
ultimately rebutting the natural suspicions that considering either
the size of awards or local variations will resolve the mysteries of
differing win ratios, but in the process deriving an important under4
standing of those mysteries. '
39 This result corresponds with an earlier result showing a strong positive correlation between success rates on pretrial motion and success rates at trial. Theodore Eisenberg, The Relationship Between Plaintiff Success Rates Before Trial and at Trial, 154 J. ROYAL
STAT. Soc'y ser. A, pt. 1, at 111 (1991).
Excluding product liability and medical malpractice cases, the ordinary least squares
regression line that best fits the judge and jury win rates is quite close to the line representing equal win rates. The regression line that includes product liability and medical
malpractice cases suggests greater variation between the judge and jury win rates.
These two categories, which also stand out in Table 3, differ from the others mostly in
their low win rates before juries.
40 See generally Marc Galanter, Case Congregationsand Their Careers, 24 LAw & Soc'y
REV. 371 (1990). While recognizing that we are working with the crude Administrative
Office categorization, see supra note 27, we believe that the categories are fairly distinctive in terms of perceived and real judge/jury differences.
41 Other possible explanations within the outcome data, such as the individual or
corporate status of the parties, likewise generate some interesting insights, such as that a
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A. Preliminary Steps
A more complete view of litigation accounts not only for
whether plaintiffs obtain judgment, but also for the size of any judgment received. The Administrative Office data allow calculation of
the mean recovery for judge and jury trials in each case category.4 2
The mean recovery is the average amount awarded in those cases in
the refined data set that show both ajudgment for plaintiff after full
trial and a positive dollar recovery. Appendix B gives, for the thirteen categories under study, mean as well as median awards, stated
using the consumer price index in terms of 1989 dollars. To explore the possible relationship among size of awards, win rates, and
the litigants' choice between judge and jury trials, we introduce several additional measures ofjudge/jury trial relationships.
We are less interested in the absolute size of recoveries in judge
and jury trials than in the relationship between the sizes of recoveries in the two kinds of trials. For example, huge recoveries in
product liability cases are not of interest here unless the amounts
differ between judge and jury trials. Using the mean recoveries, the
"mean recovery ratio" is defined as the plaintiff's mean recovery in
judge trials divided by the plaintiff's mean recovery in jury trials.
One can use the concept of actual return to account for both
the likelihood of winning and the size of recovery. For each mode of
trial in each case category, the actual return is the win rate times the
mean recovery. Using the computed actual returns, the "actual return ratio" is defined as the plaintiff's actual return in judge trials
divided by the plaintiff's actual return in jury trials.
Finally, the "percent judge trials" is the percent of trials that
are judge trials.43 The "percent jury trials" is one hundred minus
the percent judge trials.
suit between corporations is significantly more likely to be tried by a judge, but they do
not explain away our basic findings. See also Milo Geyelin, Study SuggestsJurors Are Not
Anti-Business, WALL ST.J., Apr. 20, 1992, at BI (jurors erroneously perceived to be anticorporate).
42 The maximum dollar recovery, and amount demanded, that the Administrative
Office data can accommodate is $9,999,000. This limitation has the effect of trimming
the impact on the mean of the atypically large case. We prominently use mean recovery
to facilitate the calculation of return, while recognizing that for other purposes the median award is a less distorting and more useful measure. See Deborah R. Hensler, ResearchingCivilJustice: Problems and Pitfalls, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 55,
57-58.
For further use of amount data and analysis of more sophisticated relations between
win rates and awards, see infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
43 The numbers of trials used to construct the percent judge trials column in Table
4 differ from the numbers used to compute win rates. Unlike Table 3, this new column
includes cases in which a mode of trial was commenced even though the trial was not
finished or an unambiguous judgment ultimately was not entered. Thus, for example,
settlements and other dispositions during trial appear in the percent judge trials statis-
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These new variables offer several possibilities for exploring the
differences in judge/jury data. They also provide testable hypotheses of both popular and academic impressions of judge/jury
differences.
As already noted, stereotypical views of juries, not accounting
for selection effect, forecast win ratios below one in most tort categories, reflecting juries' perceived greater sympathy for injured
plaintiffs facing large or powerful institutions. Stereotypical views
of juries similarly forecast that mean recovery ratios and actual return ratios will be less than one in most tort categories, reflecting
juries' perceived greater generosity and plaintiffs' power to insist
upon trial by jury. Popular perceptions about jury trials also suggest that percent judge trials will be low for most tort categories.
Economic theory predicts that any seemingly telling pattern in
win ratios will tend to disappear as mean recoveries enter the picture. The party choosing the mode of trial will choose the mode
that maximizes that party's expected return. For example, the plaintiff will prefer a judge trial not when the win ratio exceeds one, but
when the win rate times mean recovery from a judge trial exceeds
the analogously calculated return from ajury trial. Economic theory
thus suggests that if plaintiffs' preference dominates the choice of
trial mode, percent judge trials should increase as the actual return
ratio increases.
B.

Explaining the Data by Using Size of Awards

Table 4 presents the win ratio, mean recovery ratio, and actual
return ratio for all thirteen case categories. When focusing solely
on win ratios, only the product liability and medical malpractice categories showed large differences from 1.0. The addition of the
mean recovery and actual return ratios leads to a less clear grouping
of case categories. The frequency with which the parties select
judge trials provides the cleanest basis for dividing the cases. This
statistic for percent judge trials divides the case categories into personal-injury and non-personal-injury groupings. Personal-injury litigants overwhelmingly opt for jury trials. Non-personal-injury
litigants usually are content with judge trials. 44 The stereotypical
view is correct here.
tics but do not appear in the win rate statistics. See infra Appendix B, where
N(commenced) gives the number ofjudge and jury trials used to compute percent judge
trials and, incidentally, where N(recovery) gives the number ofjudge and jury trials used
to compute mean and median recoveries.
44 As measured by the percentage of judge trials, the marine category does not fit
comfortably with either the personal-injury or the non-personal-injury categories. We
suspect that, because of the vagaries of admiralty law and Administrative Office categori-
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4

Percent Judge Trials, Win Ratio, Mean Recovery Ratio

& Actual Return Ratio
% Judge
Trials

Win
Ratio

Mean Recovery
Actual
Ratio
Return Ratio

Personal-Irjury
Federal Employers' Liability
Medical Malpractice
Product Liability
Motor Vehicle
Other Personal Injury
Assault, Libel, Slander
Airplane Personal Injury
Marine Personal Injury

8.9
9.7
12.1
14.7
15.4
20.1
23.6
34.9

0.86*
1.72"**
1.71"**
1.15"**
1.04
0.88
0.85
0.89**

1.22
1.03
0.77
1.29
1.03
0.12
0.92
1.27

1.05
1.78
132
1.48
1.07
0.10
0.78
1.13

Non-Personal-Injury
Fraud
Torts to Land
General Contract
Torts to Personal Property
Negotiable Instruments

52.4
56.5
58.7
61.4
75.8

1.14
1.10
1.05
1.07
1.11"

0.68
0.35
0.72
0.90
0.63

0.77
0.39
0.75
0.97
0.70

* Judge/jury win rates differ at .05 level; ** at .01 level; *** at .001 level

With few exceptions the division between personal-injury and

non-personal-injury helps describe the data. More personal-injury
categories show significant differences 45 in win rates between judge
and jury trials. Only the personal injury categories show a large variation in win ratio from category to category. The mean recovery

ratios in personal-injury categories tend to be higher than the mean
recovery ratios in the non-personal-injury categories, as do the actual return ratios. The other stereotypical views, then, are incorrect.

Figure 1 combines the organizing features of Tables 3 and 4 to
reveal a seemingly telling pattern. The tables' two different group-

ings interact to yield three super-categories, or groups, of cases: (1)
prod-med, (2) personal injury other than prod-med, which we shall
call general-personal-injury, and (3) non-personal-injury. These
groups reveal a sharp division in win ratios between prod-med and
all the other categories, as well as a sharp division in percent judge
trials between non-personal-injury and all the others. 4 6 Figure l's

plot of percent judge trials against win ratios, however, shows no
correlation between mode of trial and rate of success.
zation, this category contains many cases in which there was no true choice between
judge trial and jury trial. See supra notes 34, 37.
45
See supra note 11 (discussing statistical significance).
46 In general, data from state courts making the necessary distinctions are not
widely available. See, e.g., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATIsTIcs: ANNUAL REPORT 1989. The existing data, however, do exhibit a similar dichotomy in percent judge trials between tort and contract. FLANGO ET AL., supra note 7,
at 53, 130-39. Moreover, among tort cases, a useful distinction on judge/jury questions
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Percent Judge Trials vs. Win Ratio
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FIGURE 1

Economic theory raises the question whether mode of trial correlates with actual return. Does the party choosing the trial mode
do so in a way that reflects knowledge of observed judge/jury performance? Percent judge trials exhibits a personal-injury/non-personal-injury dichotomy, which is consistent with the view that
plaintiffs' preference dominates the choice of trial mode. Therefore, the theorist would expect plaintiffs to opt more heavily for jury
trials as their actual return before juries relatively increases. But in
fact their actual return before juries is relatively highest in non-personal-injury cases, where plaintiffs shun juries. Figure 2 more generally shows an inverse relationship rather than the expected direct
relationship between percent judge trials and actual return ratio.
This is surprising.

lies between prod-med cases and others. See David B. Rottman, Tort Litigation in the State
Courts: Evidencefrom the Trial Court Information Network, ST. CT. J., Fall 1990, at 4, 15-16.
Some researchers are beginning to generate more pertinent state court data. Resuits to date appear to conform to ours. E.g., BrianJ. Ostrom & David B. Rottman, Does
Plaintiff and Defendant Status Matter?: Verdicts and Awards in Tort Litigation, at 3, 5-6
(1991) (unpublished manuscript) (in 762 tort cases tried during three-month period in
27 state courts, there were few judge trials (15%), but plaintiffs won more often before
judges (70%) than before juries (54%)).
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Percent Judge Trials vs.
Actual Return Ratio
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2

In sum, using size of awards does not provide a simple explanation for the data. Instead, it forcefully suggests that something
other than knowledge of observed economic benefits is driving the
choice between judge and jury.
C.

Explaining the Data by Using Local Variations

The differences between judge and jury trials may not be amenable to a single national explanation for all case categories. Much
interesting work by legally oriented social scientists emphasizes the
importance of local legal cultures. 4 7 We can explore whether local
explanations play a role in our problem by addressing two questions. First, after accounting for the fact that cases are tried in dozens of different federal districts, do differences in judge/jury win
rates remain? Second, can local quantitative factors, such as delay
and adjudicator's receptivity, explain the choice between judge and
jury trial?
Both questions explore whether the dominance of the case categories in explaining outcomes and choices of trial mode can be
47 E.g., Stephen Daniels, Caseload Dynamics and the Nature of Change: The Civil Business
of Trial Courts in Four Illinois Counties, 24 LAW & Soc'y REV. 299 (1990); Richard Lempert,
Docket Data and "Local Knowledge": Studying the Court and Society Link over Time, 24 LAw &
Soc'Y REv. 321 (1990); Frank W. Munger, Jr., Commercial Litigation in West Virginia State
and FederalCourts 1870-1940, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 322 (1986).
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muted or eliminated. Assessing local influence requires testing the
influence of local factors on the judge/jury data, while accounting
for a case's subject matter category. The need to account simultaneously for local and categorical charactertistics suggests use of multivariate regression-like analysis.
1.

Win Rate Differences and Locale

To address the first question, consider a model in which the
dependent variable is whether plaintiff or defendant prevails after
full trial; the independent variables used to try to explain the dependent variable are whether the trial was before judge or jury and a
series of variables identifying each United States District Court. A
separate logistic regression equation is run for each case category
(product liability, medical malpractice, and so on).48 For present
purposes, these thirteen regressions 4 9 do not lead to results importantly different from those in Table 3. The product liability, medical
malpractice, and marine personal-injury equations all show significant judge/jury effects that correspond to those in Table 3. In the
motor vehicle category, controlling for districts eliminates the significance of the judge/jury variable as a predictor of winning, but a
fair number of districts contribute to that result; no small handful of
strikingly variant districts explains the significance of the motor vehicle finding in Table 3. Thus, the most noteworthy differing win
rates are not a consequence of local variation.
In most of the cases in this study, federal courts apply the substantive law of the state in which they sit.50 Conceivably, an unusual
number of cases decided under the law of a single state might have
been the source ofjudge/jury differences. This local analysis, however, also suggests that win rate differences are not the consequence
of a few unusual legal regimes.
48 Multivariate regression is a statistical technique that quantifies the influence that
each of several factors has on the phenomenon being studied. A notable recent use of
multivariate regression in the law was the attempt to prove that the race of both the
accused and the victim played a disproportionate role in death penalty decisions in
Georgia. See DAVID C. BALDus ET AL., EqUALJUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990).
This attempt was rejected by the Supreme Court. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, reh'g
denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987). For more about regression analysis, see MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS ch. 12 (1990); DAVID W. HOSMER &
STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION (1989).
Because the dependent variable in this model is dichotomous (judgment for plain-

tiff or defendant), we use logistic regression in lieu of ordinary least squares regression.
See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra, at 448.
49 The results are available from the authors.
50

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,

313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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Trial Mode and Local Factors

The queues for judge trials and jury trials undoubtedly differ
among districts, and plaintiffs hoping to receive funds quickly may
choose the shorter queue. The choice between judge and jury trial
therefore may reflect whether one mode of trial leads to terminating
a case more quickly than the other mode. The parties' choice of
trial mode also should reflect how they believe judges and juries will
treat them. For example, the plaintiff who believes local juries are
more hostile than local judges in product liability cases will not opt
for ajury trial.
To pursue these possible explanations for choice of trial mode,
both of which assume that plaintiffs' preference dominates the
choice, consider a model in which the dependent variable is the
mode (judge or jury) in commenced trials and the independent
variables are the calendar year of termination, the thirteen case categories, and two variables used to capture local differences in delay
and receptivity between judge trials and jury trials. For each district
we compute separate mean times from filing to termination for
judge and jury trials in each of three groups of cases: prod-med,
general-personal-injury, and non-personal-injury. 5 ' To quantify the
difference in time to termination between judge trials and jury trials,
we construct a variable, "local time ratio," by dividing the mean
time for judge trials by the mean time for jury trials. If this ratio
exceeds one, the local mean time to termination is greater in cases
tried before judges than in cases tried beforejuries. 52 We also compute a "local win ratio" for each of the three groups of cases. Using
the local and other variables, a logistic regression of 40,026 cases
51 The three groups are preferable to the thirteen individual case categories because many districts lack enough cases in each of the thirteen categories to yield meaningful local means. The local mean times derive from cases in the refined data set that
show ajudgment for plaintiff or defendant after full trial and also show filing and termination dates.
52 For the period of this study, judge-tried cases tended to consume more total
time, as opposed to actual trial time, than jury-tried cases. This result should surprise
many commentators who routinely assume the opposite. E.g., RIcARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 549 (3d ed. 1986); Leon Sarky, Civil Juries, Their Decline and
Eventual Fall, I1 Loy. L. REv. 243, 255-56 (1963); see GORDON BERMANT ET AL., PROTRACTED CIVIL TRIALS: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH AND THE BAR 43-45 (1981). Possible

explanations for our result include that the judge-tried cases in the refined data set are
more complex and time-consuming than the jury-tried cases, that the judge trial queue
overall contains more cases and more complex cases than the jury trial queue, and that
trial and eventual decision by judge is more prone to procrastination than the jury process. See Leighton Bledsoe, Jury or Nonjury Trial--A Defense Viewpoint, 5 AM. JUR. TRIALS

123, 141-42 (1966) (delay in judicial decision); Prentice H. Marshall, A View from the
Bench: PracticalPerspectiveson Juries, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 147, 155-56 (same); WilliamJ.
Palmer, On Triak The Jury Trial, 20 F.R.D. 65, 78 (1958) (same).
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involving a choice between judge and jury trial yields the results
presented in Table 5.
The first numerical column shows a variable's "odds multiplier," a way of expressing the size of a variable's influence. 53 For
the case category variables, the odds multiplier is the amount by
which the odds of having a jury trial in an average case should be
multiplied if the case is in that category, holding all other variables
constant. 54 An odds multiplier of 1.0 indicates that the variable's
presence does not change the odds of having a jury trial. An odds
multiplier greater than 1.0 indicates that the variable's presence,
holding other variables constant, increases the chance of ajury trial.
An odds multiplier of less than 1.0 indicates that the presence of the
factor reduces the chance of ajury trial. For example, the 3.70 odds
multiplier for medical malpractice cases shows that, compared to an
average category, medical malpractice cases are much more likely to
be tried before juries than before judges.
The interpretation of the year, local time ratio, and local win
ratio variables differs from the interpretation of the case category
variables. For these continuous variables, the odds multiplier represents the effect of a unit increase in the variable. For example, an
increase in the local time ratio from 1.0 to 2.0 would require multiplying the odds of a jury trial by 1.31.
The second column in Table 5 shows the significance level of
the coefficients associated with each of the independent variables.
Roughly speaking, they represent the probability that the observed
result would occur by chance. 55 Thus, for all of the variables, there
is only a small probability that one would observe these results by
56
chance.
53 In multivariate logistic regression, each estimated coefficient provides an estimate of the corresponding variable's effect on the logarithm of the dependent variable's
odds, adjusting for all other variables included in the model. The odds multiplier is
obtained by taking the anti-log of the regression coefficient. HOSMER & LEMESHOW,
supra note 48, at 58.

54 The odds of a jury trial should be distinguished from the probability of a jury
trial, even though the terms "odds" and "probability" often are used interchangeably in
informal conversation. For example, medical malpractice has an odds multiplier of 3.70.
Assume that the odds ofjury trial (based on all of the other factors about a case) are 1:1,
corresponding to a 50% probability ofjury trial. The odds multiplier of 3.70 means that

the presence of medical malpractice as the case category changes the odds ofjury trial
from 1:1 to 3.70:1, corresponding to a probability ofjury trial of 79%.
55 See supra note 11. For discussion of significance levels of regression coefficients,
see FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 48, at 352-54, 451.
56 One can measure the correctness of the complete regression model's estimate of
jury trial odds by the correctness of classifications based on the estimate. FINKELSTEIN &
LEVIN, supra note 48, at 451; HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 48, at 146. That is, how

often does the regression model correctly classify a case as tried by judge or jury? The
classification table below shows that the model predicts correctly in about 76% of the
cases. For cautions about using classification tables to measure how well a model fits the

19921

TRIAL BY JURY OR JUDGE

1147

Intuitively, the local time ratio variable should be greater than
one, indicating that when judge-tried cases take longer than jurytried cases, plaintiffs are more likely to opt for a jury trial. In contrast, the expectation is that the local win ratio variable will be less
than one, indicating that as plaintiffs win relatively more frequently
before judges, they will be less likely to demand a jury trial.
TABLE

5

Logistic Regression Results
Choice of Trial Mode
Dependent Variable = Jury Trial (1), Judge Trial (0)'
(Deviation coefficients used for case categories)

Odds of fwy Tial
Multiplier
1.02

Variable
year
case categories
Negotiable Instruments
General Contract
Torts to Land
Airplane Personal Injury
Assault, Libel, Slander
Federal Employers' Liability
Marine Personal Injury
Motor Vehicle
Other Personal Injury
Medical Malpractice
Fraud
Torts to Personal Property
Product Liability
local time ratio (judge/juy)
local win ratio (judge/juy)
constant

Signif.
.000

.14
32
.34
1.41
1.75
4.54
.83
2.52
2.45
3.70
.41
.28
2.61
1.31
1.10

.000
.000

.39

.006

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.00
.000
.000
.000

data, see HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 48, at 147. We therefore also present below

other standard measures of the model's goodness-of-fit to the data.
TABLE

6

Chi-Square
-2 Log Likelihood 40504.668
Model Chi-Square 9119.305
Goodness of Fit
39941.877

Predicted
Judge
Observed
Judge
Jury

4431
22239
Overall

df

Signif.

40010

15
40010
Correct
64.40%
80.64%
75.59%
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Table 5 shows the observed values of both variables. The odds
multiplier of the local time ratio, as expected, is greater than 1.0, as
plaintiffs increasingly opt for jury trials over judge trials. Surprisingly, the odds multiplier of the local win ratio is also significantly
greater than 1.0, which is in the direction opposite to intuitive expectations. Plaintiffs are probably not consciously flocking to juries
as they observe greater success before judges. So, again, analysis
suggests something other than observed economic benefits is driv57
ing the choice between judge and jury.
The most important result embodied in Table 5 is the continued vitality of the individual case categories. As suggested by percent judge trials in Table 4, the mode of trial largely depends on the
individual category. Table 5 suggests that this effect survives con58
sideration of local phenomena.
IV
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS BEYOND THE OUTCOME DATA

We cannot explain our surprising data set-and ultimately why
civil litigants choose either judge or jury trial-by our data on case
outcomes. With all statistical analysis completed, the data still look
odd. The data's explanation must lie beyond, in real or supposed
differences between judge and jury operating on the various case
categories. And so we must look beyond, at past theoretical and
empirical work on judge/jury differences.
Surely, some differences do affect choice of trial mode. Considering trial by jury, the actual trial itself takes longer and costs
more,5 9 and this must affect choice. Similarly, a jury trial requires
57 Other models using variables to represent local mean recovery ratios and local
actual return ratios do not improve on the model presented in the text. Instead, the
explanation seems to be parties' misperceptions ofjudge/jury differences, which should
produce an inverse relationship between percent judge trials and win ratio.
58 Table 5 also shows a significant trend over time in favor ofjury trials. Controlling for case categories and local effects, there is a growing tendency to opt forjury trials
over judge trials. Interestingly, our data from 1970 through 1978 exhibit an opposite
trend. Data going back to 1940 show that the percent judge trial statistic oscillates.
WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE 109 (1990); see also Galanter, supra note 8, at 258 (reporting jury trial percentages in 1961, 1970, 1980, and
1988).
The pattern of win ratios displays no noticeable time trend, looking generally at all
thirteen case categories. In product liability cases, for a specific example, the win rate
before judges exceeds the win rate before juries fairly steadily over the years, although
the win ratio seems to be increasing since the mid-1980's. Theodore Eisenberg &James
A. Henderson, Jr., Is the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability Reflected in Trial Outcomes?,
CORNELL L.F., July 1990, at 2, 3. A recently widening difference in win rates also appears in medical malpractice cases, but not in the other categories.
59
See JAMES S. KAKALIK & RANDY L. Ross, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 37,
40, 68, 73 (1983); HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE COURT 71-81 (2d ed. 1978).
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special litigation skills of the attorney, 60 and the relative advantage
that this difference creates will influence each side's choice of trial
mode.
Yet the patterns of our data on percentages of judge and jury
trials, win rates, and mean recoveries seem to rest on more substantial differences between judges and juries that would affect their decisions. Moreover, lawyers focus on the direct effect on outcome
when explaining their choices. A leading trial practice book, in listing the factors that should guide choice, begins with (1) the nature
of the factual issue (choose jury trial if your case rests on emotional
or sympathy issues), (2) the type of client (opt for jury if the client
has an appealing personality or relatively plays the role of the little
person), and (3) the nature of the legal theory (stick with judge if the
case depends on a legal technicality). 6 1 Lawyers suppose that by
learning the differences between judge and jury in terms of outcome
under current operational methods, and then choosing accordingly,
they can greatly increase their chances of winning or of winning big.
A.

Perceptions

More generally, lawyers' longstanding perceptions of substantial judge/jury differences seem to center on a view of the jury as
biased and incompetent, relative to thejudge. Thejury's bias might
apply willfully or unwillfully either in an uneven view of the evidence or in ignoring legal restrictions on reaching a verdict, and it
normally works in favor of the plaintiff or the little person on liability and toward generosity on damages. The jury's incompetency
also infects both the factfinding process and the duty to apply the
law according to its terms. On the one hand, the supposed bias
skews the results in a predictable direction, of which counsel may
take advantage. On the other hand, the supposed incompetency
makes the outcome unpredictable, especially if the case is
complex. 6 2
60

See Bruce G. Merritt, Does a Business Ever Want ajury?, LITIGATION, Spring 1990, at

27, 29.
61
ROGER HAYDOCK &JOHN SONSTENG, TRIAL 78, 81 (1990). Other factors listed
therein are efficiency of bench trial, litigation skills of the opponent, and characteristics
of the assigned judge, as well as preferences of the client and standard of review on
appeal.
62 E.g., Merritt, supra note 60. The trial practice literature purveying such perceptions is extensive. E.g., 1 FRED LANE, LANE'S GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQ J § 9.02 (3d
ed. 1984); RICHARDSON R. LYNN, JURY TRIAL LAW AND PRACTICE 27-32 (1986); THOMAS
A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 23-24 (2d ed. 1988);JOSEPH R. NOLAN,
TRIAL PRACTICE 14 (1981); Orville Richardson,Jury or Bench Trial? Considerations,TRIAL,
Sept. 1983, at 58. Nevertheless, the perceptions are not unanimously held, and some
commentators attempt to correct or invert the admittedly prevailing views. E.g., Bledsoe, supra note 52; Jim Sullivan & Paul E. McMeans,Judge orJury, LrIGATION, Summer
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For the most part policymakers share this view of the jury. A
so-called elitist tradition, which included Alexander Hamilton, Erwin Griswold, and War:en Burger, has successfully secured the high
ground in the jury debates. It has belittled an institution that
seemed to deserve belittling. The jury has its defenders in an egalitarian or even anti-judicial tradition dating from Thomas Jefferson.
Even these defenders, however, have at times conceded, although
downplayed, the jury's bias or incompetency, while resting their de63
fense of the jury on political grounds.
JudgeJerome Frank, by a telling method, set the prevailing perceptions into a larger scheme:
I have said that, supposedly, the task of our courts is this: To
make reasoned applications of legal rules to the carefully ascertained facts of particular law-suits. You will recall my crude sche-

matization of the alleged nature of the process-R X F = D-i.e.,
the Rules times the Facts equals the Decision. Where, in that
scheme, does the jury fit in?
... Longenecker, in a book written by a practical trial lawyer
for practical trial lawyers, says: "In talking to a man who had recently served for two weeks on juries, he stated that in one case
after they had retired to consider the verdict, the foreman made a
speech to them somewhat like this: 'Now boys, you know there
was lying on both sides. Which one did the most lying? The
plaintiff is a poor man and the defendant is rich and can afford to
pay the plaintiff something. Of course the dog did not hurt the
plaintiff much, but I think we ought to give him something, don't
you?' There were several 'sures'; we thought the plaintiff might
have to split with his lawyers, so we gave him a big verdict." A
case is reported in which the jurors explained their verdict thus:
"We couldn't make head or tail of the case, or follow all the messing around the lawyers did. None of us believed the witnesses on

1984, at 18; see also Andrew Wolfson, PublicationShows Juries inJefferson Not Generous, LouNov. 28, 1988, at Al (availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers File)

ISVILLE COURIER-J.,

(reporting bar's surprise when new local jury verdict reporter revealed 50% win rate and
low average award).
Of course, perceptions about judges in general or the assigned judge in particular
influence choice too. For example, seeing the judge as an affirmatively hostile adjudicator for certain kinds of claims might push the plaintiff in pursuit of a neutral adjudicator
toward the jury. Nevertheless, perceptions ofjury trial appear to be the most prevalent
motivator in choosing between judge and jury.
63
See generallyJOHN GUINTHER, THEJURY IN AMERICA at xiii-xiv (1988); Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some BicentennialReflections, 1990 U. CmI. LEGAL F. 33, 3442; Galanter, supra note 8, at 205-09, 245-51. In the policy debate, some maintain that
the jury is equal or superior in performing the truth function. E.g., LLOYD E. MOORE,
THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 231-55 (2d ed. 1988); Palmer, supra
note 52, at 78-80.
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either side, anyway, so we made up our minds to disregard the
evidence on both sides and decide the case on its merits."...
Are jurors to blame when they decide cases in the ways I've
described? I think not. In the first place, often they cannot understand what the judge tells them about the legal rules.... It is
inconceivable that a body of twelve ordinary men, casually gathered together for a few days, could, merely from listening to the
instructions of the judge, gain the knowledge necessary to grasp
the true import of the judge's words.... The jurors usually are as
unlikely to get the meaning of those words as if they were spoken
in Chinese, Sanskrit, or Choctaw....
Suppose, however, that the jurors always did understand the
R 's. Nevertheless, often they would face amazing obstacles to ascertaining the F's....
This is no laughing matter. For prejudice has been called the
thirteenth juror, and it has been said that "Mr. Prejudice and Miss
Sympathy are the names of witnesses whose testimony is never
recorded, but must nevertheless be reckoned with in trials by
jury. ....
...
[T]he general-verdict jury trial renders absurd the conventional description of the decisional process-the R X F = D.
To my mind a better instrument than the usual jury trial could
scarcely be imagined for achieving uncertainty, capriciousness,
lack of uniformity, disregard of the R 's, and unpredictability of
decisions.64

B.

Realities

Perceptions such as these are undoubtedly important in determining which cases go to jury trial and which to thejudge. 6 5 Nevertheless, these perceptions' basis in reality is much more
problematic. Indeed, one of the more remarkable lessons that empirical study has to offer the law is that virtually no evidence exists to
support the prevailing ingrained intuitions about juries. In fact, existing evidence is to the contrary.
Admittedly, not much effective empirical work exists on the
quality of the jury's performance, and there is even less on juries'
performance as compared to that ofjudges. Studies on broad ques64

JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL

110, 114, 116, 118, 122-23 (1949) (no foot-

notes omitted); see Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J.),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948).
65 See Galanter, supra note 8, at 227 (discussing key role of "jury knowledge").

1152

CORNELL LI W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1124

tions regarding the jury are difficult to do, and correspondingly
shaky to interpret.6 6 But the evidence, such as it is, consistently supports a view of the jury as generally unbiased and competent, or at
least so compared to a judge. The fact that jury and judge show a
high degree of agreement is better supported. 67
Research, for example, indicates that the strength of the trial
evidence is the most important determinant of the verdict.6 8 Evaluated over the run of cases, juries are good factfinders. 69 More specifically, research does not support a view of the jury as overly
generous on awards, 70 frequently ignoring the law, 7 1 or institutionally unable to handle complex cases.7 2 Related research indeed suggests that a jury could even outperform a judge, because the judge
66 See GUiNTHER, supra note 63, at xvii-xxviii (stressing that the fundamental limitation arises from researchers' lack of access to real jurors); MACCOUN, supra note 6, at 1823; RobertJ. MacCoun, ExperimentalResearch on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCIENCE 1046
(1989).
67 Of the various contesting standards for evaluating the jury's performance, comparison to ajudge's performance seems the uniquely appropriate one for our purposes.
See generally MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PICus, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE 57-65
(1987) (discussing several different standards). But cf Marianne Constable, What Books
About Juries RevealAbout Social Science and Law, 16 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 353 (1991) (generally criticizing contemporary jury studies for focusing on the "law of the officials").
68
See GUINTHER, supra note 63, at 101-02; SALLY M.A. LLoYD-BOSToCK, LAW IN
PRACTICE 48 (1989); MACCOUN, supra note 6, at 19-22; Valerie P. Hans, The Jurys Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 177,
184, 194; Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1987). "Indeed, the power of evidence is so well recognized by jury
researchers that when studying processes other than evidence, they must calibrate the
evidence to be moderate so that it leaves some variance to be influenced by the variables
under study." MICHAEL J. SAKS & REID HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 68
(1978).
69 See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 113-48, 245-47 (1986)
(summarizing the literature); REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THEJURY 230 (1983) (mockjury
study); SAUL M. KASSIN & AWRENCE S. WRIGHTsMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 207-16 (1988) (summarizing the literature and also attrib-

uting any jury shortcomings more to defective legal procedures than to jury's intrinsic
nature); RrrAJ. SIMON, THEJURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SocIr 49-71 (1980) (summarizing empirical studies).
70 See GUINTHER, supra note 63, at 169-72; Edith Greene, On Juries and DamageAwards:
The Process of Decisionmaking, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 225, 246; see also
Stephen Daniels &Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1 (1990) (analyzing jury awards of punitive damages). At most, the research suggests
that on average a jury would give an award 20% higher than would a judge. Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the CivilJury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1065 (1964); see HANS &
VIDMAR, supra note 69, at 161.
71
See GuINTHER, supra note 63, at 224-27; HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 69, at 160-63;
HASTIE ET AL., supra note 69, at 231-32; JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND POLITICS 182-83
(1992). Compare Cecil et al., supra note 7, at 748-49 (jurors' difficulty in understanding
instructions) with id. at 763-64 (reasons for diminished effect on verdicts).
72
See GUiNTHER, supra note 63, at 208-13; HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 69, at 250-51;
KAsSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 69, at 125-27; Cecil et al., supra note 7, at 733-36,
750-64; Peter W. Sperlich, The Casefor PreservingTrial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 65
JUDICATURE 394, 413-14 (1982).
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is also human and groups typically outperform individuals by virtue
of superiority in such tasks as recall of facts and correction of
73
errors.
The classic work in this area by Kalven and Zeisel addressed
reliability (the ability to treat like cases alike) rather than the validity
or correctness ofjury decisionmaking. Their questionnaires to presiding judges in some 4000 actual civil jury trials in the 1950's
yielded data showing a 78% agreement between judge and jury on
liability.7 4 When judge and jury disagreed, they exhibited no distinct pattern other than the juries' very small tendency to favor
75
plaintiffs relative to judges.
When compared to other human decisionmakers, the rate of
agreement is more impressive than it first appears. This 78% agreement rate is better than the rate of agreement between scientists
doing peer review, employment interviewers ranking applicants, and
psychiatrists and physicians diagnosing patients, and almost as good
as the 79% or 80% rate of agreement between judges making sentencing decisions in an experimental setting.7 6 So although theory
73 See MACCOUN, supra note 6, at 22-23; Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better
than One?, LAw & CoNTEMp. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205, 205-07; cf HASTIE ET AL.,
supra note 69, at 230 (group ofjurors will outperform individual juror).
74 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63-64 (2d ed. 1971),
criticallyreviewed byJohn Kaplan, Book Review, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 475 (1967); Michael H.
Walsh, The AmericanJury: A Reassessment, 79 YALE LJ. 142 (1969). See generally Valerie P.
Hans & Neil Vidmar, The AmericanJury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 323
(1991).
75 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 74, at 63-64. Thejury but not the judge found for
the plaintiff in 12%6 of the cases, while the jury but not the judge found for the defendant in 10%o of the cases:

JURY
P

tU

D

010

See also Zeisel, supra note 7, at 69-70 (analyzing result); Galanter, supra note 8, at 204-05
(reporting more recent polls supporting similar result).
76 See Michael J. Saks, Enhancingand RestrainingAccuracy in Adjudication, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1988, at 243, 246-48 (based on work by Shari S. Diamond).
Data from the Netherlands suggest that even at the highest level of civil law systems,
where elite experts neutrally render advisory opinions before high court judges decide
civil cases, the rate of agreement is modest. The First Chamber of the Netherlands'
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plausibly suggests some judge/jury differences-such as that juries,
because of a need for compromise to produce a unanimous verdict,
would tend to give plaintiffs more wins but less money77 -the significance of any such differences seems to fade in actuality. Apparently, judge trial and jury trial combine to operate a decisionmaking
78
system that is, at least in one sense, highly reliable.
Much of the recent research has focused on jury verdicts, revealing trends such as the average award markedly increasing in re-

highest court, the Hoge Raad, decides private civil law cases. JoHAN F. BRUINSMA,
CASSATIERECHTSPRAAK IN CIVIELE ZAKEN (Cassation Proceedings in Private Law Cases)
155 (1988). Before deciding, thejustices receive advisory opinions from a branch of the
Attorney General's Department attached to the Hoge Raad, which is independent of the
Ministry of Justice and is not charged with representing the government's position in
Hoge Raad cases. Id. at 157-58. The Hoge Raad and this branch of the Attorney General's Department are regarded as the two most elite legal offices in the Netherlands. Id
at 155.
In the period from January 1, 1982, to July 1, 1983, covering 445 cases, the Hoge
Raad disagreed with the advice of the attorneys general in 16% of the cases. Id. at 75. A
study of cases decided from 1970 to 1974 found disagreement in 23.4% of the cases. Id
at 74. The explanation for the later, lower disagreement rate seems to be the increasing
specialization by subject-matter of the attorneys general. Id. A breakdown of the later
period's cases confirms this, as the rate of disagreement with the advisory opinions substantially increased (to 25%) for less experienced, less specialized attorneys general. Id.
Interpretation of these results depends on at least three additional observations.
First, the Hoge Raad has no discretionary jurisdiction. Unlike the United States
Supreme Court, it must decide all cases presented to it. Id. at 155. This prevents the
court from filling its docket with cases selected for their difficulty, resulting in an expectation of greater than normal disagreement. Second, the court's jurisdiction reaches
only questions of law, id, so the noise of factual disputes does not inflate the rate of
disagreement. Third, to the extent the Hoge Raad is deferential to the Attorney General's recommendations, the 16% disagreement rate understates the true disagreement
rate.

Results from another jurisdiction also shed some light on the rate of judge/jury
disagreement. In Japan from 1928 to 1943, in serious criminal cases, juries of twelve
private citizens heard cases along with three trial judges and rendered advisory verdicts
by majority vote. In 94.78% of the 460 cases, the judges accepted the jury's recommendation. Takashi Maruta, Jury Competence: The Japanese Case-An Analysis of the
Criminal Jury Trials in Japan, 1928-1943, at 3-4 (1991) (unpublished manuscript).
77 See GUINTHER, supra note 63, at 96-97. But see ROBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS
AND

METHODS 302 (2d ed. 1973) (suggesting that the judge is more inclined to compro-

mise than the jury).
78

The encouraging results persist in category-specific research. See, e.g., DANZON,

supra note 27, at 42 (court system, including juries, is far from arbitrary in medical malpractice cases); Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's

Shadow, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1991, at 43 (jury's usual competence and fairness shown by empirical study of medical malpractice verdicts and insurer's pretrial
evaluations); Neil Vidmar, Medical MalpracticeJuries, DUKE L. MAG., Summer 1991, at 8,

12 (in experimental setting, jurors gave lower median awards than arbitrators).
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cent years.79 Even if accurate, 0 these observations do not bear on
the issue of jury performance versus judge performance. Judges,
who go wholly unobserved in this research, might be responding
similarly to similar forces. For a specific example, Figure 3 presents
from our data, in millions of 1989 dollars, the mean recovery in
judge and jury trials of successful product liability cases over the
calendar years covered by this study.8 ' The similarity of the recovery trends suggests that the explanation for trends in awards lies
82
somewhere other than in peculiarities of the jury system.

79

E.g., MARK A. PETERSON, CIVILJURIES IN THE 1980s: TRENDS INJURY TRIALS AND

VERDICTS IN CALIFORNIA AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

(1987) (also recounting previous

studies by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice); see Michael Chiorazzi et al., Empirical
Studies in Civil Procedure:A Selected Annotated Bibliography, Lw & CONrEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 87, 152-57.
80 Such research, see, e.g., MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, COMPARATIVE
JUSTICE: CIVILJURY VERDICTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES, 1959-1980, at 7988 (1983) (discussing methodology), rests on relatively few cases from a few localities,
see Galanter, supra note 8, at 223-24, and draws data only from possibly biased jury verdict reporters, see id at 236-37, 249. See also Daniels, supra note 4, at 300-04 (problems
with data); Hensler, supra note 42, at 56-57 (misinterpretation of data).
81 The virtues of the product liability example include this category's substantial
number of cases. Also, it is an area where the especially vivid results of jury verdict
research, see Daniels, supra note 4, at 297-300, commonly lead to policy recommendations, e.g., VIsCuSI, supra note 9, at 87-116. Nevertheless, Figure 3 is representative of
other categories, so that related ones such as other personal injury and diverse ones
such as general contract exhibit similar patterns.
82 The recovery data are difficult to interpret. First, judges and juries are deciding
different sets of cases. However, the predominant selection effect here would seemingly
be to lower the mean recovery before judges relative to the mean recovery beforejuries.
See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. Second, as explained supra note 42, the
data trim the highest product liability awards. However, awards in excess of $9,999,000
in then current dollars are very rare, comprising only one or two awards in each year
except 1984-1986. Moreover, their proportional occurrence in judge and jury trials is
roughly equivalent. Third, one must keep median recoveries in view. Over the years,
however, judge/jury median recoveries here show the same general pattern as mean
recoveries.
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Misperception as Explanation

Our intention is not to survey accurately the lawyers' perhaps
ill-founded perceptions ofjuries and judges, or to resolve or even
detail the considerable uncertainties concerning actual judge/jury
differences. Instead, our chosen task is simply to explore whether
an explanation for our data could plausibly lie in these supposed or
real differences.
As we have noted already, perceptions of the jury's bias and
incompetency do not directly translate into the observed patterns of
the data. Supposed judge/jury differences may have a role to play,
but it is a subtle one. Also, as noted above in regard to actual differences, any such differences that create an advantage for one side or
merely increase uncertainty for both should be bargained out, resulting in approximately equal win rates before judge andjury. Real
judge/jury differences might exist, but theoretically they will not
substantially reveal themselves in our data on win rates if the parties
know about the differences.
Misperceptions ofjudge/jury differences must therefore constitute the truly potent explanation for our data. These misperceptions could comprise both real but unperceived differences and
imagined but nonexistent differences. We can rule out some sweep-
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ing generalizations. For example, any thought that all lawyers see
the jury as consistently pro-plaintiff founders on data showing that
the jury has not by any stretch become the exclusive trial mode.
Nonetheless, one could formulate more refined misperceptions to
explain the data plausibly, although one must ultimately be prepared to meet the theoretical objection that such misperceptions
should tend to undergo correction eventually after litigants repeatedly observe the misperceptions' consequences.
Here is a prime example of drawing on misperception to explain the data. Consider the folkloric view of the judge as more reliable on liability, and of the jury as biased in favor of the plaintiff or
the little person and biased toward generosity on damages for unliquidated claims. This persistent folklore would lead to the prediction
that personal-injury cases would flow predominantly to jury trial,
while the other cases such as contract would predominantly go to
judge trial. Indeed, one would expect the preferences to be strong
enough to overwhelm any effect the type of adjudication would have
on settlement rate.8 3 Thus the preferences should show up in percentage ofjudge trials. In fact, our data confirm this prediction with
remarkable clarity: the percentage of judge trials is uniformly low
84
for personal-injury cases and uniformly high for other cases.
The special significance of this example is its suggestion that
the litigants' perceptions driving the data may crystallize around
groups of case categories, such as the group of non-personal-injury
cases. Within groups, real judge/jury differences may be going unperceived, which would also affect the data. Along those lines-persistent misperceptions that exaggerate any judge/jury differences
between broad groups of case categories or that ignore small differences within groups-we shall seek the most plausible explanation
of the data.

83 See generally George L. Priest, The Role of the CivilJuryin a System of PrivateLitigation,
1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 195-99.

84 Other factors might also contribute to this phenomenon. For example, the personal-injury grouping tends also to correspond to those case categories in which prejudgment interest is unavailable in somejurisdictions. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF REMEDIES

165-74 (1973);

CHARLES

T. MCCORMICK,

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW

OF DAMAGES 213-27 (1935);JOHN F. O'CONNELL, REMEDIES IN A NUTSHELL 64-65 (2d ed.

1985). As our data show thatjudge-tried cases consume more time from filing to termination, see supra note 52, plaintiffs in this group would have an added incentive to opt for
a jury. Cf STEPHEN J. CARROLL, JURY AWARDS AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN TORT
CASES (1983) (juries might implicitly award prejudgment interest).
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V
OUR EXPLANATION

The data make one thing dear: more is at work here than judge
and jury treating a similar flow of cases similarly. Instead, either the
judge and the jury act differently as adjudicators or the parties differentially filter the cases flowing to them, or both. This realization
suggests an analytic approach, represented by Figure 4. Thus, the
data clearly preclude the upper-left box as an explanation.
Discussions of the data with colleagues have shown that on
their own they intuit this framework. When confronted with, say,
the fact that prod-med exhibits very high win ratios, colleagues elect
one or the other of the framework's dimensions. For example, using some real-world insight to turn the popular view on its head,
some have formulated a version of what we shall call Stab #1:
85
"Judges and juries are different. Juries tend to blame the victims.

So naturally plaintiffs win more often before judges."
Speaking more generally, we can place this stab in the upperright box: judge and jury treating an undifferentiated case mix differently. By itself this is a sorely inadequate explanation. First, any
such stab initially appears implausible as a general explanation because it runs against the popular view. Second, existing empirical
observations do not support the contention that judges and juries
are in fact so very different, even if one could theorize why they
would be different in the required ways. Finally, explaining why litigants have failed to adjust to such judge/jury differences would be
difficult; plaintiffs should be less enamored ofjury trials and defendants should embrace such trials.

85 On this human tendency under some conditions, see Aaron Abbott & Frank
HeckmanJuries and Child Death Cases, CASE & COM., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 3, 6-8.
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Other colleagues infuse an academic notion to formulate Stab
#2: "Parties send a different case mix to judge and jury. Only in
weak cases does the plaintiff opt for the crazy jury. So naturally
plaintiffs win more often before judges."
This stab lies in the lower-left box: judge and jury similarly
treating a differentiated mix of cases. Although this approach is
more sophisticated, Stab #2 is still subject to three basic rebuttals,
which upon reflection also apply to Stab # 1. First, if in strong cases
the plaintiff seeks the sanity ofjudge trial, then why does the defendant not seek the less reliable jury trial? Indeed, given that each
side in our adversary system is seeking an advantage and is able to
demand a jury, Stab #2 would lead to the inaccurate conclusion
that virtually every trial should be ajury trial. Second, if parties do
send a different case mix to judge and jury, then why does settlement bargaining not offset the difference, leaving for trial cases of
similar strength? Indeed, accepting the academic view fully would
lead to the conclusion that, even if they hear very different sets of
cases, both judge and jury trial should exhibit approximately the
same equilibrium win rate, which is again not accurate. Third, if this
stab at an explanation is valid, then why do the data for the other
case categories not exhibit the same phenomenon? The low win ratios that typify other personal-injury categories offer a strong
rebuttal.
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Nevertheless, these stabs at explaining the results hold promise. They are probably both at work, but they need more rigor,
which will unavoidably complicate them. The entire case-filtering
process requires more detailed consideration to determine how it
yields, despite the selection effect, a residue ofjudge-tried cases different from the residue ofjury-tried cases. We need to consider the
decisional process that might involve some differences in treatment
by judge and jury. Throughout we shall emphasize the essential
role of misperception in producing the observed results. Moreover,
we must treat the different case categories separately to account for
the odd patterns of the data.
Thus, we focus on the lower-right box in Figure 4: a differentiated mix of cases going to judge and jury, with the parties largely
imagining judge/jury differences, but also with judge and jury unperceivedly acting slightly differently as adjudicators. We shall first
describe the general mechanism of filtering and deciding tried
cases. Next, recognizing that the case characteristics that trigger a
jury request differ for a personal-injury case and a non-personalinjury case, we shall explain how parties alter their case-mix filter
according to case group, as well as how adjudicators might alter
their decisional behavior according to category; we shall also suggest why the settlement process does not obliterate the effect of
these processes in our data. Finally, we shall use our explanation to
draw lessons from the now expressive data.
A.

Mechanism Generalities

Once a dispute becomes a lawsuit by filing the complaint with
the court, the mechanism that produces our data goes through three
phases. The initial phase is the routing process by which the parties
choose the mode of trial. Either side can opt for jury trial, but the
requesting party must do so promptly.8 6 Plaintiffs' preference
might dominate this choice of trial mode in practice, because de8 7
fendants might, with fair consistency, be content with judge trial.
Nevertheless, legally the two sides have an equal choice. The choice
likely relies heavily on popular perceptions of judge/jury differences. The party's urge might be to avoid the jury's supposed proplaintiff bias and its incompetence, or to seek a trait of that sort.
The result of the routing process may be a judge/jury case mix differentiated on the basis of strength on the liability issue.
Next, consider the settlement process. Bargaining often occurs
before case filing and might extend into the trial and beyond. Our
86
87

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 38, 39.
See Merritt, supra note 60, at 27.

1992]

TRIAL BY JURY OR JUDGE

1161

concern here, however, is with the role of bargaining in further filtering the case mix to produce the residues ofjudge-tried cases and
jury-tried cases. The academic view has much to say on this process.
It suggests that parties should bargain out known judge/jury differences, which would tend to leave residues of cases with approximately equal win rates. And most case categories other than prodmed exhibit similar win rates. Misperceptions, however, could impede the equalizing tendency. Thus, the routing and settlement
processes would work together to filter the case mix, possibly resulting in very different sets of cases reaching decision before judge and
before jury.
Finally, there is the decisionalprocess. In reality, judge and jury
do not appear to operate very differently. Although they probably
show some differences, and although the parties probably do not
perceive some of these differences, the primary explanatory effect
likely lies in the case-mix filter operating through the routing and
settlement processes.
For the purposes of our explanation, the key process of the
three is clearly the settlement process. The critical insight is that
this process operates under parties' misperceptions of judge/jury
differences. Misinformed bargaining produces the odd results in
the data. Indeed, we could make the unrealistic assumption that the
parties randomly choose between judge and jury trial, so that the
routing process has no impact on the data. That is, we need not rely
on assumptions about routing, such as that only the plaintiff chooses
mode of trial or that any hypothesized filtering effect results from
the routing process. Likewise, we could make the unrealistic assumption that judge and jury are identical adjudicators, so that the
decisional process has no impact. That is, we need not rely on assumptions of unperceived judge/jury differences. Instead, our critical contention is that, somewhere along the line from dispute to
judgment, misperceptions lead to a set of unsettled cases reaching
decision by the judge that produces a win rate different from the
jury win rate.
B.

Case-Category Particulars

Explaining how parties alter the mix of cases reaching judges
and juries requires identifying factors that make judge orjury attractive or repellent. The data suggest that these factors vary across
case categories. Plaintiffs might prefer jury trial in some categories
out of fear ofjudicial hostility or out of belief in favorable jury bias.
They may prefer judge trial in some cases because they are more
confident of victory there than before a jury that they view as less
reliable or as maintaining a bias that could turn on them in a factu-
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ally unappealing case. By varying the degree to which such factors
in combination apply to particular case categories, we can develop
an explanation for the observed results.
1. Product Liability and Medical MalpracticeGroup
The story in our data that most loudly calls for explanation concerns the hot areas of tort law. For product liability 88 and medical
malpractice, 8 9 the plaintiff does far better before judge than before
jury, especially as compared to the other categories. Figure 5 compares the win rates in prod-med with the average of the win rates in
the other categories. Surprise turns to mystery when we add the
datum that the parties nevertheless select judge trial in only about
10% of product liability and medical malpractice trials.
Win Rates in Judge & Jury Trials:
Product, Medical & Other

65
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.55
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_40
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Source: Administrative Office Data, 1979-1989
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Because prod-med cases often involve controversial claims and
big stakes, 90 we explain this strangeness by theorizing that the par88
89

See generally Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 27.
See generally DANZON, supra note 27.

90 If one combines judge and jury cases, product liability and medical malpractice
cases have by far the two highest mean recoveries of all thirteen categories considered
here. See infra Appendix B; see also Daniels & Martin, supra note 4, at 340-42 (state data

showing product liability and medical malpractice jury cases have higher median verdicts
than other tort categories). Indeed, recoveries are much greater in prod-med than in
other personal-injury cases such as motor vehicle, even controlling for injury and other
case characteristics. See DANZON, supra note 27, at 53-57.
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ties, who might not view juries as biased favorably, nevertheless see
judges in general (or the assigned judge in particular) as consistently more hostile to these kinds of claims on liability and conservative on damages. Therefore, the defendant would fairly uniformly
prefer the judge, and the plaintiff would prefer a jury9 l-except in
those few cases, very strong on liability, where the risk-averse plaintiff sees the jury's unpredictability as just too great a risk to run.
This perception of relative judicial hostility, combined with a view of
the jury as a "noisy" decisionmaker, would create a very skewed
case-mix filter. Thus, the resulting data should reflect a much better
win rate for judge than for jury, while nevertheless jury trials would
92
far outnumber judge trials.
An additional filtering effect could be at work in big-stakes
prod-med cases. Thejury's perceived (or, for that matter, real) variability on damages could be impeding settlement in very weak jury
cases by causing the parties to value the claim differently. The
plaintiff foresees the possibility of a mega-verdict, and so values the
case highly enough to preclude settlement. The plaintiff's premium
may derive from the occasional risk-preference of a plaintiff (or
more likely that of the plaintiff's contingent-fee attorney), from
over-optimism on expected return caused by high-end possibilities,
or even from an economically irrational pot-of-gold mentality. 9 3
The end effect would be to lower the jury win rate.
Thus, by some filtering devices operating during the routing
and settlement processes, a stronger residue of cases meet judge
This appears to be true even in medical malpractice cases. See 1 DAVID W. Loui11.26 (1991). To the extent such
considerations vary between medical malpractice and product liability cases, we would
have to change the details of our explanation, but we could do so within the same general explanatory mechanism.
92
See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text (criminal analogy). Given that a
party can choose the mode of trial, the party might strategically try to choose in a way
that sends the adjudicator a favorable signal, saying in effect that "I chose you as adjudicator because the strong side usually chooses you." In civil cases, signalling is in the
abstract impossible: if ajury is chosen, then the jury must act naively as it does not know
which side chose jury trial, or at least does not know the significance of the signal; if a
judge is chosen, then both sides sent the same signal. However, as the choice of mode
of trial becomes in reality more predominantly a one-sided choice by the plaintiff, some
signalling to the judge becomes possible. This would nonetheless be a subtle signal in a
complex setting. Signalling would also have offsetting effects on win rate as, mindful of
the signal, the plaintiff alters the flow of cases to judge trial while the judge offsettingly
alters decision on those cases. Moreover, the settlement process should take the signal
into account and thereby obliterate its effects on win rate. Therefore, we can with justification overlook the secondary effects of signalling. Indeed, for like reasons we can overlook strategic behavior of the judge, such as any attempt to reward the plaintiff for
waiving jury trial.
93 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 33-34 (1973).
91

SELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
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trial than jury trial. A sharp difference in win rates results. Figure 6
summarizes the processes for prod-med cases.

Case Flow
Product Liability & Medical Malpractice
As in all pi cases,
trust in attributes of Ju
leads to sprinkling
of judge trials

As in all pi cases,
belief In more favorable jury
leads jury trial
mode to dominate

expectation of judge
bias and jury
incompetence
skews routing process

similar misperceptions
skew settlement
process

dissimilar win rates
observed because
of case-mix
filtering

FIGURE

6

We further theorize as to mean recovery ratios in prod-med
cases. First, for any group of tried cases, one might expect that a
higher win rate pushes toward a lower mean recovery. 94 Second,
94 Initially, regarding the decision to pursue a disputed claim, one might expect
such an inverse relationship to exist in any group of disputes. See Wittman, supra note
13, at 188. The settlement process theoretically should not remove it in the subset of
tried cases. See Wittman, supra note 20, at 335-36. Additionally, regarding the split into
judge and jury trials, one would expect, all else being constant, that the inverse relationship would survive.
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the bigger cases tend to go to the jury rather than the judge.9 5
Third, the judge may in fact be somewhat more restrained in awarding damages than the jury.96 All else being constant, these three
pressures suggest that the few prod-med cases going to judges,
while resulting heavily in plaintiffs' wins, will produce relatively
small damages awards.
All else is not constant, however, in selection effect or in the
judge/jury choice, as this Article shows by Tables 4 and 5. The inverse relationship thus remains at most a tendency frequently obscured by other pressures. 97 Some of those other pressures might
be rather specific to the case category. For example, one might expect a more direct relationship of win rate and mean recovery in
medical malpractice cases, because the very size of injury might imply a greater chance of malpractice. 98 The normal inverse relationship between win rate and mean recovery, which would prevail in
product liability cases, would therefore disappear in medical malpractice cases. 9 9 This in turn would mean a higher mean recovery
ratio for medical malpractice than for product liability, which is in
fact true.
Our data support all these suppositions: prod-med cases have
very low percentages ofjudge trials, very high win ratios, and contrasting mean recovery ratios. Moreover, familiar data from serious
95 Plaintiffs might simply seek to avoid the more expensive jury in smaller cases. See
supra note 59 and accompanying text. Also, the plaintiffs' perception ofjury generosity
in potentially big cases should create resistance to any urge toward judge trial, causing
the filtering mechanism to work most effectively in sending smaller cases to the judge.
Regardless of explanation, we can support the statement in the text. The Administrative Office data show for most cases the plaintiff's demand for damages in dollars.
We can calculate a mean demand for those cases in the refined data set that show both
an amount demanded and a judgment for plaintiff or defendant after full trial. Appendix B gives the mean demands for judge and jury trials, as well as N(demand), which is
the number ofjudge and jury trials used to compute those mean demands. We could
then add to our statistics a "mean demand ratio" for each case category, defined to be
the mean demand in judge trials divided by the mean demand injury trials. Suffice it to
say that for all but one (other personal injury) of the thirteen case categories, the mean
demand ratio is less than one, indicating that demands are larger in jury trials.
The mean demand ratio for product liability is 0.34 and for medical malpractice is
0.92. Interestingly, the mean demand ratios are almost uniformly lower in the nonpersonal-injury categories (averaging 0.58) than in the general-personal-injury categories (averaging 0.77).
96 See supra note 70.
97 See Priest, supra note 13, at 237-40. Moreover, the use of regression to control
for mean recovery, as suggested by Wittman, supra note 20, at 336-37 (semble), does not
substantially diminish the overall negative impact ofjury trial on win rate.
98 Compare DANZON, supra note 27, at 38 (the more severe the injury in medical malpractice cases, the more likely it was caused by negligent behavior) with Viscusi, supra
note 9, at 52-54 (contrary product liability data).
99 Support for this lies in a comparison of the relationships between overall win
rate in fully tried cases in the refined data set (without the distorting Bendectin cases
described supra note 37) and the amount demanded in those tried cases:
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criminal cases reassuringly provide a confirmatory analogy to our
data. Accused felons effectively get to choose the mode of trial and
overwhelmingly choose trial by jury, at a rate in the neighborhood
of 80%. Yet they fare far better before judges, with their conviction
rate being about 50%, compared with ajury conviction rate of about
80%.100 The best explanation involves the assumption that the
many guilty defendants seek the jury's supposedly noisy processing,
while the innocent few prefer the supposedly more reliable judge
trial. Thus, although criminal defendants might perceive the judge
as a less favorably inclined adjudicator, the judge's small flow of
cases is skewed to yield a lower conviction rate. 0 1
50
45
40')[
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FIGURE 7

Incidentally, a direct relationship between overall win rate and the amount demanded,
as for the medical malpractice category, characterizes the general-personal-injury group,
except for FELA and assault-libel-slander. An inverse relationship characterizes the
non-personal-injury group other than torts to personal property.
Adding the mean demand ratio, supra note 95, to the picture provides some support
for our explanation. A substantial departure of the mean demand ratio from the usual
background tendency to give big cases to the jury and small cases to the judge suggests
that different sets of cases are reaching judge andjury. In the medical malpractice category, where large claims correlate with strong cases, the relatively high demand ratio
and the direct relationship shown by this graph imply that the strong cases are reaching
the judge. Similarly, in the product liability category, where small claims correlate with
strong cases, the very low demand ratio and the inverse relationship again imply that the
strong cases are reaching thejudge. The consistent feature, and the explanatory mechanism, seems to be filtering on the basis of the case's strength on the liability issue.
100 See Gerald D. Gay et al., Noisy Juries and the Choice of Trial Mode in a Sequential
Signalling Game: Theory and Evidence, 20 RAND J. ECON. 196, 206-09 (1989).
101 Id. at 198, 211 (innovative analysis of criminal data); cf Harold W. Elder, Trials
and Settlements in the CriminalCourts:An EmpiricalAnalysis of Dispositionsand Sentencing, 18 J.
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General-Personal-InjuryGroup

For personal-injury categories other than prod-med, the data
follow a more predictable pattern. Indeed, the challenge instead
becomes explaining why categories such as FELA, assault-libel-slander, airplane personal injury, and marine personal injury are ordinary enough not to share the extreme characteristics of product
liability and medical malpractice. We theorize that in these less controversial and more traditional tort categories the parties generally
see the judge as neutral, rather than hostile to claimants. Meanwhile, the parties' perception of the jury as usually biased favorably
toward these kinds of claims, especially as to amount of damages,
overcomes most fear of jury noise. In contrast to the prod-med
group, where the perception of jury incompetence works to skew
the case-mix filter, here the operative force is the perception ofjury
bias.
Accordingly, the defendant would prefer the judge, and the
plaintiff would usually opt for the jury. As a result, we should observe a low percentage of judge trials.102 Indeed, where the jury's
pro-plaintiff bias is seen as especially strong, as in FELA cases, the
percentage of judge trials should be particularly low.
As to differential case mix, we would not expect -pronounced
effects, so that the win ratio would not depart far from one. In other
words, we should observe, despite the huge number of cases in our
sample, a substantial equivalency of result before judge and jury.
Nevertheless, a small difference should result from the following
process. Although some plaintiffs still might abandon the usually
favorable jury for the more reliable judge in strong cases, other
plaintiffs would prefer a more dispassionate judge in cases where
unappealing facts might alienate ajury. More generally, the plaintiff
would abandon the jury wherever judicial neutrality seems important. If, however, the judge disappoints relative to expectationsthat is, if the judge turns out to be less neutral or more like the jury
than expected-then the settlement process based on such expectations will yield a case mix skewed to produce a win ratio somewhat
below one.
Note that here the desire for a favorable judge draws the plaintiff in some cases to judge trial, rather than a fear ofjury noise driving the reluctant plaintiff to a relatively hostile judge in very strong
cases. Accordingly, the mix of these general-personal-injury cases
routed to the judge differs from the mix of prod-med cases routed
LEGAL STUD. 191 (1989) (initial attempt to apply selection effect theory to criminal

process).
102 See supra text accompanying note 84.
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to the judge. Also, the settlement process proceeds on different assumptions. Indeed, the settlement process alone explains the low
win ratio for these general-personal-injury categories, while the
routing process, shaped in part by the greater belief injury generosity on damages, might help segregate strong prod-med cases for
judge trial. The end result of these distinctions is a marked divergence in win ratio between the general-personal-injury group and
the prod-med group.
We would not expect mean recovery ratios in the general-personal-injury categories to follow the fairly consistent pattern of win
ratios. Here the cases filtered for judge and jury trial would be subject to conflicting pressures on mean recovery.1 0 3 The mean recovery ratio thus should show no distinctive pattern.
Again, our data bear out all these predictions: a small percentage of judge trials, a win ratio around 0.9, and an erratic mean recovery ratio for the categories of FELA, assault-libel-slander,
airplane personal injury, and marine personal injury.
The only pronounced oddity in the personal-injury data comes
in the categories of motor vehicle and other personal injury, where
the win ratios are respectively 1.15 and 1.04. Here the explanation
might be that these categories share the characteristics of the two
subgroupings of personal-injury categories-prod-med, on the one
hand, and FELA, assault-libel-slander, airplane personal injury, and
marine personal injury, on the other hand. This is plausible for the
category of other personal injury, where its catch-all nature would
imply shared characteristics. For motor vehicle cases, the plaintiff
might see the judge as hostile to run-of-the-mill state law cases clogging federal court dockets but not to the premises of motor vehicle
liability, and might see the jury as a more neutral and hence normally a relatively more favorable adjudicator deciding between two
similarly situated parties. Some plaintiffs might turn to the judge in
fairly strong cases out of fear of the jury's incompetent unpredictability and trust in the judge's fundamental neutrality, an effect we
do not observe substantially in the traditional tort categories because of the plaintiffs' perception that pro-plaintiff jury bias works
advantageously even in strong cases. Other plaintiffs might turn to
the judge in occasional cases with the view that the jury there might
be more anti-plaintiff than the judge, an effect we do not observe
substantially in the hot tort categories because of the plaintiffs' perception that anti-plaintiff judicial hostility prevails across the board.
That is, plaintiffs might send the judge both fairly strong cases to
103
Some of the pressures on mean recovery ratio discussed above, but not the
others, could tend to raise the mean recovery ratio above one. See supra notes 94-99 and
accompanying text.
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avoid jury noise and also occasional cases to seek a supposedly more
favorable adjudicator. Alternatively, while the judge in general-personal-injury cases might disappoint expectations, so might the jury
in motor vehicle cases, just as the jury apparently does in prod-med
cases.' 0 4 Under either explanation, the result would be a win ratio
falling between the ratios for the two other subgroupings of personal-injury categories.
3.

Non-Personal-Injury Group

For this group of categories-negotiable instruments, torts to
personal property, torts to land, general contracts, and fraud
cases-our data are even less surprising. We again theorize that the
parties generally see the judge as a neutral adjudicator. In contrast
to the general-personal-injury group, however, here the plaintiff
sees the jury as much less consistently biased favorably toward the
plaintiff, with less room to play generously with damages.' 0 5
Accordingly, the defendant still might prefer the judge, but so
might the plaintiff, especially in the cases, strong on liability, where
the plaintiff seeks the perceived reliability ofjudge trial. The plaintiff would abandon the judge only where the jury appears to be the
more favorable adjudicator-but if the jury disappoints, the settlement process will produce a relatively lower jury win rate. The
powerfully explanatory notion here seems analogous to that for the
general-personal-injury group: occasional abandonment of the
usual adjudicator (here the judge, rather than the jury) for the adjudicator expected to be more favorable, a settlement process proceeding on the basis of those expectations, and disappointment of
those expectations so that the win ratio departs slightly from one.
Thus, we should observe a high percentage ofjudge trials. We
again would not expect pronounced effects on win ratio. But the
mix of cases reaching the judge should be relatively strong on liability, and inversely that mix should be relatively small on mean recovery.' 0 6 Therefore, the win ratio should consistently be somewhat
above one, while the mean recovery ratio should remain well below
one.
104 SeeJoHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 111-12 (1988) (arguing that
concern about insurance premiums has come to dampen jury's pro-plaintiff bias in motor vehicle cases). On the substantial role of the insurance industry in generating public
perception of a prod-med crisis since the mid-1980's, see Daniels, supra note 4; and on
the slightly dampening effect of such a perception on jury generosity, see Greene et al.,
supra note 7.
105 Informal surveys show little difference in perceptions of success before judges
and before juries in contract cases. In each of the three surveys, supra note 12, one
cannot reject the hypothesis of no perceived difference. Many respondents predicted a
507o win rate for both judge and jury in contract cases.
106 See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
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Our data conform: a high percentage ofjudge trials, a win ratio
around 1.1, and a low mean recovery ratio for the non-personalinjury categories.
4. Intra-Group Effects
Intuition suggests that the parties' perceptions driving the casemix filter operate mainly at a gross level. Parties tend to stereotype
in terms as gross as, say, all five non-personal-injury categories as
one group. Our data are consistent with that intuition. An overall
constancy of data points exists within each of the three large
groups-rather remarkable constancy as to percent judge trials, fair
constancy as to win ratios, and some constancy as to mean recovery
ratios. In other words, parties seem to be sending a similar mix of
cases to the judge and to the jury in each of the categories within
any group.
Nonetheless, small differences in win ratio exist within each
group. To the extent that these do not come from differences in
case mix or random fluctuations, they reflect small but real
judge/jury differences between categories. Our data could suggest,
for example, that judge trial is a slightly more favorable mode of
trial in negotiable instruments cases than is judge trial in other contract cases, as compared to the jury.
Possibly, parties' altering category-by-category the case mix going to two virtually identical modes of trial could be the sole explanation of the patterns of our data. Yet it is hard to believe that
judge and jury exhibit absolutely no systematic but unperceived differences as adjudicators. Moreover, it would be hard to hypothesize
the misperceptions that would drive the required case-mix filter if
the difference in win ratio were significant. For example, it would
be mildly strange for settlement to give the weak negotiable instruments cases to the jury and the strong ones to the judge more selectively than other contract cases. Thus, differences in case mix are
probably not the sole explanation, and actual judge/jury differences
have a minor explanatory role.
5.

Summary

Returning to the analytic framework to summarize, we believe
that persistent misperceptions exaggerating any judge/jury differences and varying between broad groups of case categories skew the
case mix and thus largely explain the patterns of our data. But persistent misperceptions that ignore small but real judge/jury differences within those groups are probably also at work to help explain
the finer variations in our data. Therefore, our explanation lies in
the lower-right box of the framework in Figure 8.
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Having located anew our explanation, we now formulate it expressly. Judges and juries exhibit, across case categories, some differences as adjudicators. Parties use their intense perceptions of
differences to choose between judge and jury trial, but mainly differentiate on the gross level of broad groups of categories. At that
level they exaggerate any judge/jury differences, and so send varying percentages and very different mixes of cases to the two modes
of trial. Within groups, the parties tend to ignore finer judge/jury
differences, and so generally fail to differentiate the case mix at this
secondary level.
After so invoking the routing and decisional processes, we must
face the question of why the key settlement process does not obliterate in our data the effects of our explanation. After all, if the parties
accurately perceive any judge/jury differences, then, once they
choose the mode of trial, their knowledgeable bargaining should
leave on both thejudge and the jury calendars a residue of unsettled
cases exhibiting approximately the same equilibrium win rate. We
know that this result does not eventuate, so therefore the parties
must inaccurately perceive the realities ofjudge and jury trial.
Personal-injury plaintiffs may opt for judge trial in circumstances where they view the judge, relative to the jury, as hostile
(prod-med group) or neutral (general-personal-injury group). The
judge, however, may turn out on average to be more like the jury
than expected, and hence either much less hostile or less neutral as
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a relative matter. These misperceptions thus produce win ratios
that are respectively very high and moderately low, as the judge performs either much more favorably or less favorably, relative to the
jury than expected. Similarly, non-personal-injury plaintiffs may opt
for jury, trial when they view the jury as more favorable. The jury
may turn out on average to be more like the judge than expected,
producing a moderately high win ratio.
The more pronounced effect in the prod-med group may result
from the greater degree of misperception. In particular, not only
may the judge turn out to be less hostile than expected, but even
more so the jury may turn out to be less favorable than expected, as
suggested by the unusually low jury win rates in prod-med cases.
These two disappointments would whipsaw the win ratio to atypical
heights. 10 7 Further, the exceptional power of the filtering mechanisms to route strong prod-med cases to the judge and weak ones to
the jury may accentuate the effect.
There still remains the question of why these misperceptions do
not eventually undergo correction, as litigants repeatedly observe
the consequences of their misperceptions. For our explanation to
work, we need not merely misperceptions of judge/jury realities,
but persistent misperceptions.
We believe that persistence of misperceptions is more than
plausible in this context. Surprising and longstanding misperceptions about the legal system are not uncommon.10 8 In this area, elitist perceptions of a biased and incompetent jury system seem to
conform to the natural order of things and can even be comforting.
Empirical evidence to the contrary has been slow in accumulating
and is still far from overwhelming. The data on trial results have
not been widely reported and, as we are about to show, remain frustratingly ambiguous once available. Finally, many lawyers prefer to
rely on personal experience and anecdote.' 0 9 All in all, lawyers'
misperceptions of judge/jury differences have understandably prevailed for a long time.
C.

Lessons from Data

Repeated mention of misperceptions begets thoughts of lessons to draw from the data. There are a few.
107 Compare supra note 58 (noting possible time trend in prod-med cases) with supra
note 104 (suggesting possible cause).
108 See Theodore Eisenberg &James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in
ProductsLiability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731 (1992); Theodore Eisenberg & StewartJ. Schwab,
What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal CourtSystem?, 56 U. CHi. L. REV. 501 (1989); Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 541; Wolfson, supra note 62. See generally THOMAS
GILOVICH, How WE KNow WHAT ISN'T SO (1991).
109 See generally Galanter, supra note 8, at 227-51.
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The biggest lesson is one of humility. Practitioners and policymakers who believe that plaintiffs as a group always do better before
juries are wrong. Academicians who predict that judge and jury win
rates equalize are wrong. We can say that both prevailing intuition
and prevailing theory will find in the data no direct evidence in
support.
On the more mundane or practical level, however, lessons become more elusive. The reason for ambiguity lies, of course, in rigorous selection effect theory. For example, because they hear
different sets of cases, one cannot conclude from the very high win
ratio in the product liability and medical malpractice group that the
judge is more favorable toward plaintiffs than the jury. Instead, the
high win ratio probably reflects only the selection of tremendously
strong cases for the judge, a set on which jury verdicts might have
been no different from, or possibly more favorable than, judicial de-

cisions. Once one realizes that the parties are altering the case-mix
input to judge and jury trials, one cannot with great confidence draw
lessons from the output.
We can, however, construct the most plausible explanation of
the data, as we have tried to do in this Article. We have formulated
likely perceptions ofjudge/jury differences, surmised that these are
exaggerations of a reality in which judge/jury similarities dominate,
and demonstrated how these persistent misperceptions would generate the major part of the data's patterns. A minor explanatory
role falls to unperceived real judge/jury differences.
If one accepts our explanation, lessons start to emerge. Returning to the same example of product liability and medical malpractice, one could conclude that the jury is less of an advantage for
plaintiffs, and the judge less of a disadvantage, than the parties
think. That realization should affect the terms of settlement. 10
Moreover, if only one side comes to that realization, that side could
manipulate the judge/jury choice to its bargaining advantage."I
Furthermore, if we are correct that to some degree judge and
jury are in actuality unperceivedly different in handling similar
cases, additional lessons emerge. For example, ifjudge trial is a relatively more favorable mode of trial in negotiable instruments cases
than is judge trial in other contract cases, then litigants have something to learn.
See GUINTHER, supra note 63, at 44.
Litigants' most valuable lessons lie, of course, in the settlement process. Trials
are rare events, and so lessons on whether to try a case to judge or jury will matter to
few persons. Ubiquitous bargaining, however, proceeds in the shadow of trial results,
making their interpretation worthy of study. See Galanter, supra note 8, at 209-12, 22732, 241-42, 257.
110
111
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Even if the specifics of our explanation are incorrect, we believe
we have fixed upon a dominant explanatory mechanism: parties'
persistent misperceptions ofjudge/jury differences, with the consequence of a case selection reaching judge trial that is different from
the case selection reaching jury trial.
CONCLUSION

Our data on outcomes in judge and jury trials hold surprises,
confounding both intuitionists and theorists. Plaintiffs as a group
do not always fare better before juries, nor do they fare equally as
well before judges and juries. Reality is much more complicated,
and certainly neither litigants in weighing the choice between judge
and jury nor policymakers in weighing drastic proposals to restrict
that choice should proceed on the simplistic prevailing views of
reality.
The data most prominently show that in product liability and
medical malpractice cases, the plaintiffs win far more frequently in
the few judge trials than in the many jury trials. This discovery
should alter prevailing views. Therefore plaintiffs should learn to
waive jury trial, while defendants should finally begin flocking to the
anti-plaintiff jury.
Wrong! Few would accept that direct inference, and rightly so.
It flies in the face of not only every time-honored stereotype but also
all well-established facts. It is nevertheless representative of a variety of easy explanations of the data. The choice is between a direct,
implausible conclusion of that sort and an indirect, complex alternative. Recognition of such a stark choice, while driving this Article's
pursuit of the alternative conclusion, should also induce the necessary tolerance for sometimes seemingly thin motivations, zigzagging
explanations, and ambiguous effects.
The most plausible explanation of the data would acknowledge
that judges and juries exhibit some differences as adjudicators.
However, parties, through their lawyers, perceive big differences
and so send varying percentages and very different mixes of cases to
the two modes of trial. Persistent misperceptions of category-based
judge/jury differences allow certain effects of actual adjudicator differences and of differential case selection to survive the settlement
process and so generate the patterns of our data. Uncovering the
operative misperceptions-especially those that imagine nonexistent differences but also those that ignore real differences-can lead
to lessons profound and practical.
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APPENDIX A

Plaintiff Win Rate In Judge Trials and Jury Trials
Federal Court Cases: 1979-1989
Jury Tda

JudAe Thai

N
Admin.u OML
Code (unrefined)

win
Rate

N
(unr ned)

Win
Rate

CONTcRA

Insurance
Marine
MilnerAct
Negotiable Instruments
Recovery of Ovcrments &Enforcement Judg.
Recovery of Medicare Overpayments
Recovery of Defaulted Student c
Recovery of Overpaymenta of Vetenm Benefits
Stocktoldera Suits
Other Contract Actions
Employce Relations
Contract Product Liability

110
120
130
140
150
151
152
153
160
190
191"
195

1783
1362
402
655
140
9
33
74
37
6431
2
142

.5D
.68
.76
.80
.80
.56
.85
.82
.41
.65
1.00
54

2301
105
56
176
18
3
1
8
15
3795
0
233

.56
.70
.80
.72
.72
1.00
L00
.50
.60
.66
n/a
58

REAL PROPERTY
Land Condemnation
Forecosum
Rent, Lease Ejectment
Tom to Land
Tort - Product Liability
Other Real Property Actions

210
220
230
240
245
290

4394
328
118
244
18
498

.17
.5
.72
.61
.22
.55

$69
33
21
152
44
95

.22
.79
.62
.59
.36
.60

TORTS~persoaal btfury
Airplane
Airplane Product Liability
Assault, Libel, Slander
Federal Employers' Liability
Marine
Marine - Product Liability
Motor Vehicle
Motor Vehicle - Product Liability
Other Personal Injury

310
315
320
330
340
345
350
355
360

200
41
171
109
1408
38
1148
45
2044

.46
.34
A
.57
.57
55
.66
51
.45

372
178
480
1171
1848
29
3654
445
3834

.59
39
.50
.72
.63
.34
.60
.32
.49

362

565

52

759

.30

Personal Injury - Product Liability
Asbestos Personal Injury - Product Liability

365
368

489
18

.44
.50

3839
174

.26
.42

370
371
380
385

574
19
893
98

.63
.68
.60
.44

389
4
470
238

.60
50
59
.45

Other Civil Rights
Voting
Jobs
Accommodations
Welfare

440
441
442
443
444

3275
302
8264
186
63

.32
.73
.20
.48
56

4350
8
2378
109
6

.36
.62
.39
.45
0.00

PRISONER PETITIONS
Vacate Sentence ( 2255)

510

120

.18

4

.25

Parole Board Review
Habeas Corpus
Mandamus and Other
Prisoner - Civil Rights

520"
530
540
550

5
1172
62
4309

.20
.22
.48
.12

0
29
10
1617

n/a
.21
.10
.17

Personal Injury - Medical Malpractice

TOKRS.peroaal proerty do
Other Fraud
Truth in .
Other Personal Property Damage
Property Damage - Product Liability
CIVIL RIGHTS
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FORF~rrURE & PENALTY
Agriculture Acts
Food & Drug Acts
Liquor Laws
Airline Regulations

610
620
630
650

Occupational Safety/Health
Other Forfeiture & Penalty Suits

41
115
2
17

.37
.9
1.00
.76

660

is

690

920

Fair Labor Standards Act
Labor/Management ReUlatics Act
Labor/Management Reporting & Disa. Act
Railway Labor Act
Other Labor Litigation
ERLSA

710
720
730
740
790
791

PROPERTY RIGHTS
Copyright
Patent
Trademark

1
33
0
1

0.00
.64
0/a
1.00

.60

0

n/a

.86

63

.78

727
943
160
67
470
560

.64
.50
A2
.30
.40
.56

175
186
30
16
317
75

54
.35
.60
A4
.44
J9

820
830
840

316
556
550

.76
.49
.69

84
2D6
119

.68
.62
.59

Social Security (before 7/1/78)
Medicare Act PanA (42 USC l9Sff(b))

860"
861

39
16

.2
.19

4
0

Black Lung (30 USC 923)
Disability Insurance (42 USC 405(g))
Supplemental Security Income Title XVI
RSI (42 USC 405(g))

1.00
n/a

862
863
864
865

6
110
19
2

.67
.47
.47
0.00

1
12
2
1

OTHER STATURES
State Re-apportionment
Antitrust
Bankruptcy Trustee
Bankruptcy Transfer Rule 915(b)
Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 801
Withdrawal
Banks and BankinS
Interstate Commerce
Deportation
Antitrust - Ekctrcal Equipment
Selective Service
Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Tax Suits
IRS - Third Party Suits (26 USC 7609)
Customer Ctallenge (12 USC 3410)
Review or Enforcement
Other StatutoryActions
Agricultural Acts
Economic Stabilization Act
Enviroomental Matters
Energy Allocation Act
Freedom of Information Act of 1974

400
410
420
421*
422
423
430
450
460
470"
810
850
870
871"
875
880
890
891
892
893
894
895

Appeal of EAJA Fee

22
270
99
24
361
46
76
189
28
14
2
595
1312
171
3
1
1474
211
8
243
52
54

.77
.40
.71
.67
.46
.50
.47
.63
.21
.64
0.00
-52
.67
.88
.33
LO0
.47
.30
.38
.55
.85
.33

0
473
22
14
18
50
37
40
2
25
0
602
404
7
1
0
401
15
1
11
4
1

900

1

0.00

Constitutionality of State Statutes

0

n/a

950

144

.46

9

.33

LOCAL QUESIION
Domestic Relations
Insanity
Probate
Other

910
920
930
990

242
31
0
24

.95
.94
n/a
.46

4
1
3
12

1.00
1.00
L00
.50

[AMOR LAWS

SOCIAL SECURITY

*Discontinued code

0.00
MO
.50
0.00

n/a
53
.68
.50
.44
.66
S7
.67
.50
.60
n/a
.54
5
S7
0.00
n/a
.61
.73
1.00
.73
0
0.00

1992]
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APPENDIX B
Sizable Categories Involving Clear Judge/Jury Choice
Federal Court Cases: 1979-189
Judge Tid/
N
(qmoewD)

General
Airplane Personal Injury

Federal Employers' Liability
Assault, Libel, Slander
Marine Personal Injury
Other Personal Injury
General Contract
Torts to Personal Property
Torts to Land
Negotiable Instruments
Fraud
Motor Vehicle
Prod-Med
Product Liability
Medical Malpractice

N
(rec-S)

139
214
122
1350
788
5469
1078
298
838
426
943

38
52
35
460
239
2493
400
113
474
184
374

827
114

198
26

mem1

-

Me.lk
e

N
MM
(dowmi) D@wP

0.89
0.86
0.06
0.76
0.85
0.70
0.61
0.24
0.70 "
0.47
0.76

0.11
0.09
0.01
0.09
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.03
0.10
0.02
0.05

58
56
86
889
516
3979
515
145
456
308
438

1.89
0.45
1.09
0.87
1.15
0.60
0.41
0.70
0.25
0.72
0.89

0.91
1.44

0.10
0.19

456
42

1.17
1.90

Jwy Tria
(ce
General
Airplane Personal Injury
Federal Employers' Liability
Assault, Libel, Slander
Marine Personal Injury
Other Personal Injury
General Contract
Torts to Personal Property
Torts to Land
Negotiable Instruments
Fraud
Motor Vehicle

N
449
2202
485
2513
4325
3854
677
229
267
387
5479

-Mm

N
(ream

)

Mean
euza

Media
Re-e

N
(ae

Man
wnme

196
808
146
889
1265
1509
250
85
111
148
2036

0.97
0.70
0.55
0.60
0.83
0.97
0.68
0.67
1.10
0.69
0.59

0.13
0.13
0.05
0.14
0.09
0.09
0.05
0.06
0.13
0.11
0.06

191
747
339
1455
2769
2458
331
96
110
265
2723

1.95
0.88
1.63
1.07
1.11
1.0
0.62
1.08
0.53
1.38
0.97

956
203

1.18
1.40

0.19
0.16

3648
422

3A9
2.06

Prod-Med

Product Liability
Medical Malpractice
* MIllons of 1989 doUars

